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EGYPT 
IMPEACHMENT: A LOSING CASE 
Dr. Mohamed Abdelaal 
ABSTRACT: This paper examines the impeachment mechanism in 
Egypt after the 2011 Revolution and the 2013 events and the removal 
of Presidents Hosni Mubarak and Mohamed Morsi.  In doing so, the 
paper will provide a critical analysis to the impeachment clauses in 
both the 2012 and 2014 Constitutions, in an attempt to discover to 
what extent the pre 2011 impeachment differs from that of post 2011.  
Further, it addresses the issue of whether the recall election could 
make a good alternative to impeachment in Egypt.  Specifically, we 
will briefly shed light on the history of the recall device as well as its 
emergence as one feature of direct democracy.  Our focus will then 
shift to discussing the possibility of adopting the recall device in 
Egypt and the challenges that might face such adoption.  Eventually, 
we will propose a recall provision that could replace impeachment in 
Egypt’s current constitution. 
 
AUTHOR: Dr. Mohamed Abdelaal, SJD, is an Assistant Professor of 
Law at Alexandria University School of Law in Alexandria, Egypt, 
and an Adjunct Professor of Law at Indiana University Robert H. 
McKinney School of Law, Indianapolis, IN. He is admitted to the bar 
in Egypt and is a member of the Egyptian American Rule of Law As-











1 HOLDING THE EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/16  6:36 PM 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction ......................................................................................... 3	
The Constitution of 2012 ..................................................................... 4	
A. Background ........................................................................... 4	
B. Impeachment in the 2012 Constitution ............................... 14	
The Constitution of 2014 ................................................................... 22	
A. Background ......................................................................... 22	
B. Impeachment in the 2014 Constitution ............................... 28	
Practicing Impeachment: The Case of President Morsi .................... 35	
The Recall Election as an Alternative ............................................... 43	



























1 HOLDING THE EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/16  6:36 PM 
Holding the Executive Accountable  Vol. IV, No. I 
 3 
Introduction 
With a long constitutional history dating back to 1882 when it 
was an Ottoman province, Egypt is considered to be the oldest consti-
tutional state in the Arab world.1  Under the monarchy system, Egypt 
had two constitutions, 1923 and 1930, neither of which installed 
Egypt as a constitutional monarchy.2  In other words, in the Egyptian 
Kingdom the king was not a symbolic figurehead, but rather a strong 
political actor who ruled the state and was heavily involved in its ad-
ministration.3  However, he was immune from accountability.4 
After the abolition of the monarchy and the declaration of the re-
public in 1952, Egypt underwent the drafting and application of six 
constitutions—1956, 1958, 1964, 1971, 2012, and 2014—in which 
the president and his cabinet were recognized as active participants in 
the day-to-day administration of the state under a semi-presidential 
system of governance.5  However, the many presidential powers en-
visioned in these constitutions, as well as practiced under most of 
them, revealed the president to be the sole executive, aided by only a 
symbolic involvement of the cabinet.6 
Most of the constitutions adopted in the Egyptian Republic were 
guided by the themes of democracy, human dignity, and political ac-
countability, as they were the outcome either of bitter battles against 
colonial powers (the 1954 and 1956 Constitutions),7 or the overthrow 
of authoritarian regimes (the 1971 and 2012 Constitutions).8 Howev-
er, these constitutions manifest a remarkable ability to yield excep-
tions regarding political accountability.9 
For the purposes of this article, I will examine the issue of politi-
cal accountability from the perspective of presidential impeachment 
 
 1. Egyptian Constitutions, MIDAN MASR, 
http://www.midanmasr.com/en/default.aspx?PageID=15 (last visited Oct. 9, 2015). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Sujit Choudhry & Richard Stacey, Chapter 5: Semi-presidential government in Tunisia 
and Egypt, CONSTITUTION BUILDING: A GLOBAL R. 33 (2013), 
http://www.idea.int/publications/constitution-building-a-global-
review/upload/cbgr_c5.pdf. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Egyptian Constitutions, supra note 1. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.  
1 HOLDING THE EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/16  6:36 PM 
2015-2016  UB Journal of International Law 
 4 
in Egypt’s Constitutions of 2012 and 2014.  They were the outcome 
of two popular uprisings and a bitter struggle against two authoritari-
an regimes, those of Mubarak and of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Then 
I will discuss the possibility of adopting the recall election as an al-
ternative to impeachment in Egypt. 
The Constitution of 2012 
A. Background 
Following the assassination of President Sadat, Vice President 
Hosni Mubarak assumed the presidency.10  Mubarak’s first years of 
presidency teemed with serious challenges. He was required to face 
the escalating debt rate in Egypt, radical Islamists, and Egypt’s dete-
riorating relations with the Arab nations after the Egypt-Israel Peace 
Treaty.11  Indeed, Mubarak did a good job during his early years in 
the office of the presidency.  His policy in suppressing the Islamists, 
fighting terrorism in Egypt, and maintaining peace with Israel earned 
him a close relationship with the United States and the West that 
helped him to reschedule the country’s debt and to cure certain eco-
nomic problems.12  Further, Mubarak succeeded in restoring Egypt’s 
relation with the Arab nations.   
Under his regime Egypt was readmitted to the Arab League13 af-
ter having been suspended as a consequence of the peace treaty with 
Israel.14 
 
 10. Mohamed Hosni Mubarak was Egypt’s fourth president who served from 1981 to 
2011. Mubarak was appointed as Egypt’s vice president in 1975 during the regime of 
President Anwar Al-Sadat, and thus he assumed the office of the president in 1981 fol-
lowing the assassination of President Sadat. Michael Slackman, A Brittle Leader, Ap-
pearing Strong, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12mubarak.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0. 
 11. Id. 





13. The Arab League is a regional organization of Arab countries in Africa and Asia. The 
Organization was formed on March 22, 1945 in Cairo, Egypt. The Organization aims 
“to draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate their political ac-
tivities with the aim of realizing a close collaboration between them, to safeguard their 
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Despite his acceptable performance in the foreign policy arena, 
Mubarak did not perform well in internal and societal affairs.  With a 
steady growth in the rate of population to more than 80 million,15 
continuously escalating prices, increased rates of inflation, high lev-
els of unemployment,16 and a wide gap between rich and poor peo-
ple,17 Egyptians suffered a severe deterioration in their societal and 
economic life. Further, Mubarak’s regime was marred by restriction 
of freedoms.18  For almost three decades, Mubarak ruled Egypt under 
the grip of emergency law, which restricted individuals’ freedoms 
and suspended several constitutional rights.19 
 
independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and inter-
ests of the Arab countries.” Pact of the League of Arab States, Art. 2, League of Arab 
States, ICNL, www.icnl.org/research/monitor/las.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
 14. After ten years of suspension, Egypt regained its full membership in the Arab League 
in 1989 and the League’s headquarters returned to Cairo after being moved to Tunis, 
Tunisia. Profile: Arab League- Timeline, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-15747947 (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
 15. In 2011, Egypt’s population reached 82,537,000 with an annual growth rate of 1.7%. 
See, Egypt Country Profile, UNESCO, 
http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer/document.aspx?ReportId=121&IF_Lan
guage=en&BR_Country=2200 (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
 16. By the end of 2010, Egypt’s unemployment rate reached 9.0% and this rate jumped to 
11.8% in the second quarter of 2011. See, Egypt Country Statistics, U.N., 
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=EGYPT (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).  
 17. Slackman, supra note 10. 















19. Law No. 162 of 1958, al-Jarida al-Rismiyyah, 28 Sept. 1958 (Egypt). The Emergency 
Law was first enacted in 1958. The law was imposed during the Egypt-Israel War in 
1967 and was suspended after the 1973 War before being reactivated following the as-
sassination of President Sadat in 1981 and has been in effect for almost 30 years dur-
ing the regime of President Mubarak. See Williams, supra note 18.The Law authorizes 
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Corruption in his regime also roused the Egyptians against Mu-
barak.20 In an attempt to secure his office and prolong his presidency, 
Mubarak tried to take control of the institutions of the country.21  A 
significant feature of corruption in Mubarak’s era was the rise to 
power of businessmen who endeavored desperately to serve only 
their own business interests.22 
Another aspect of corruption was electoral fraud, which reached 
its acme in the Parliamentary Election of 2010.23  At this time, the 
government decided that the judiciary would not supervise the elec-
tion,24 and it initiated a wide arrest campaign targeting opposition 
figures.25  As a result of these practices, the National Democratic Par-
 
the president to take the required precautions to restrict the freedom of meeting, 
movement, residence, arrest suspects or those who threat public security and public 
order, to inspect people and places notwithstanding the provisions of the Criminal Pro-
cedures Law. Law No. 162 of 1958, al-Jarida al-Rismiyyah, 28 Sept. 1958, Art.3(1) 
(Egypt). It also entitles the president to order surveillance on any kind of messages, 
monitor, confiscate and close newspapers, leaflets, publications, fees and all means of 
expression, propaganda and advertising before its publication. Id., at Art.3(2). Further, 
under this law, the president determines the opening and closing times of public stores, 
withdraws weapons’ licenses and evacuates or segregates certain regions. Id., at 
Art.3(3),(5),(6). 
 20. See generally BRUCE RUTHERFORD, EGYPT AFTER MUBARAK: LIBERALISM, ISLAM, AND 
DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD (Princeton University Press, 2008). 
 21. Id.  
 22. A stark example of such a selfishly corrupt and powerful business figure was Ahmed 
Ezz, who served as the Organization Secretary of the National Democratic Party 
(NDP), Mubarak’s ruling party. Ezz was the majority leader of the Egyptian Parlia-
ment, as well as the absolute monopolist of the steel industry in Egypt, with an esti-
mated wealth of $3 billion. To further his own interests, Ezz significantly enhanced 
monopolies rather than fighting it, backing every effort to thwart any legislative bill in-
troduced in parliament that would criminalize monopoly. Likewise, Rashid Mohamed 
Rashid, former Minister of Trade and Industry, had an estimated personal wealth of $2 
billion, and Zuhair Garrana, former Minister of Tourism, was worth $2.2 billion. Tom 
Ramstack, Obama Optimistic about Egypt as Negotiators make concessions, GANT 
DAILY, http://gantdaily.com/2011/02/07/obama-optimistic-about-egypt-as-negotiators-
make-concessions/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).  
 23. Egypt Rebuffs U.S. Call for Foreign Monitors at Election, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/world/africa/19egypt.html?_r=0. 
 24. In addition, the government refused any kind of international monitoring for the elec-
toral process, arguing that international monitoring would undermine the sovereignty 
of the state and allow interference in its internal affairs. Id. 
 25. Mubarak extended the state of emergency just before the election, ignoring his prom-
ise in 2005 to put an end to the state of emergency and to introduce a terrorism law to 
replace emergency law. In 2010, the Egyptian security forces started a wide arrest 
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ty (NDP), the ruling party, swept the election with virtually no repre-
sentation of opposition.26 
Police brutality also plagued Mubarak’s regime. The 2009 Hu-
man Rights Report of the U.S. Department of State reported that “the 
government’s respect for human rights remained poor, and serious 
abuses continued in many areas,”27 and “security forces committed 
arbitrary or unlawful killings during the year.”28  A notable incident 
that sparked a massive wave of anger over Egypt’s police practices 
and significantly contributed to toppling Mubarak’s regime was the 
death of Khaled Saeed, who was severely beaten to death by police 
officers after being identified as “suspicious.”29 
 
campaign against anti-government political activists, including members of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood after it announced its participation in the Election. Elections in Egypt 
State of Permanent Emergency Incompatible with Free and Fair, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/11/23/elections-egypt.  
26. The NDP won 420 out of 518 seats with a success rate of 81%. Independent candidates 
won 68 seats, of which 53 seats were secured by NDP defectors. While, all other polit-
ical parties won 15 seats, the Muslim Brotherhood won only one seat down from 88 
seats in the previous election of 2005. Official Results: 16 Opposition, 424 NDP, 65 
“independents”, AHRAM ONLINE, (Dec. 6, 2010), 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/5/1321/Egypt/Egypt-Elections-/Official-
results—-opposition,—NDP,—independents.aspx. 
 27. 2009 Human Rights Report: Egypt, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, (Mar. 11, 2010), 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136067.htm. 
 28. Id. Further, the report stated, “[D]omestic and international human rights groups re-
ported that the Ministry of Interior (MOI) State Security Investigative Service (SSIS), 
police, and other government entities continued to employ torture to extract infor-
mation or force confessions, [and that] police and the SSIS reportedly employed tor-
ture methods such as stripping and blindfolding victims; suspending victims by the 
wrists and ankles in contorted positions or from a ceiling or door frame with feet just 
touching the floor; beating victims with fists, whips, metal rods, or other objects; using 
electric shocks; dousing victims with cold water; sleep deprivation; and sexual abuse, 







29. Wael Ghonim, an Egyptian computer engineer, political activist and prominent revolu-
tionary figure, created a memorial Facebook’s page, Kullena Khaled Saeed (We Are 
All Khaled Saeed), to commemorate Saeed. The page dramatically attracted many fol-
lowers nationwide in support for Saeed’s case and against the brutal and oppressive 
practices of the Egyptian police. In short, during Mubarak’s regime, the police force 
 
1 HOLDING THE EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/16  6:36 PM 
2015-2016  UB Journal of International Law 
 8 
Perhaps the growing rumors that Mubarak sought for his son 
Gamal to inherit his rule were the last proverbial nails in his coffin. 
After many attempts to introduce him into Egypt’s political life,30 
Gamal’s grooming process peaked in February 2000 when the elder 
Mubarak appointed him a member of the NDP’s General Secretari-
at.31  Gamal later became the Assistant Secretary General and the 
Secretary of the Policy Committee, which allowed him to play a large 
role in determining how the ruling party should function.32  Further, 
in an attempt to support his son legislatively, in 2005 Mubarak en-
sured that Article 76 of the 1971 Constitution was amended to allow 
multi-candidate presidential elections.33  However, the amendment 
also imposed further restrictions regarding the eligibility to run for 
the office of president34 in a move interpreted by many politicians and 
 
was changed from being a tool for the people’s security to a weapon in the regime’s 
hand to threaten and suppress the people. See WAEL GHONIM, REVOLUTION 2.0: THE 
POWER OF THE PEOPLE IS GREATER THAN THE PEOPLE IN POWER 58-81 (2012).  On 
March 3, 2014, Alexandria Criminal Court sentenced two police officers to ten years 
of aggravated imprisonment after they were found guilty of false arrest, using exces-
sive force, and the manslaughter of Saeed. Appeals Court upholds death sentence, long 
prison terms in Sidi Gaber Case, MADA MASR, (Feb. 15, 2015), 
http://www.madamasr.com/news/appeals-court-uhpolds-death-sentence-long-prison-
terms-sidi-gaber-case. 
 30. See Muhammad Abdul Aziz & Youssef Hussein, The President, the Son, and the Mili-
tary: The Question of Succession in Egypt, 9/10 THE ARAB STUD. J. 73 (Fall 
2001/Spring 2002).  The first attempt to introduce Gamal into political life was in 
1999, when rumors abounded that a new political party, Hizb al-Mustaqbal (The Fu-
ture Party) would be established and funded by the wealthy NDP loyalists, and Gamal 
would be installed as the party president, Id. at 75. However, the government denied 
any attempt to establish the party, ending these speculations. Id. The grooming process 
of Gamal continued when he was installed as the Chairman of Gama ͑at Giel al-
Mustaqbal (The Future Generation Organization), a non-governmental organization 
founded in 1998 to provide educational, housing and employment services for youth. 
Id. at 84. 
 31. Jason Brownlee, The Heir Apparency of Gamal Mubarak, 15/16 THE ARAB STUD. J. 
36, 46 (Fall 2007/Spring 2008). 
 32. Id. at 47.  
 33. Id.   
 
 34. See Brownlee, supra note 31. The amendment required that an eligible independent 
candidate should secure the support of at least 250 elected representatives (sixty-five 
members of the People’s Assembly, twenty-five of the Shura Council, ten members of 
each of the Municipal Councils in at least fourteen governorates and twenty more from 
some combination of the three). Id. at 47-48. Further, eligible candidates are to include 
only “member of the party’s supreme board, provided that a candidate is a member of 
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activists as an attempt from Mubarak to secure the presidency for 
himself and his son after him. 
All these circumstances contributed to the Egyptian Revolution 
of 2011. Egyptians flooded the streets on January 25, 2011, protest-
ing against police brutality and the deteriorating socio-economic situ-
ations.35  Political activists named January 25th Yawm Al-ġaḍab 
(“Day of Anger”), as thousands of people demonstrated in Cairo, oc-
cupying Tahrir Square (“Liberation Square”), the icon of the 2011 
Revolution, chanting “Bread…Freedom…Social justice.”36 Demon-
strations and protests soon spread beyond the borders of Cairo to 
reach other major cities such as Alexandria, Suez, Aswan, and Ismai-
lia.  Nationwide demonstrations and protests continued through the 
following two days.  Police forces stepped up their responses using 
 
that board for a least one year, and that the political party completed five continuous 
years and hold at least 5% of seats in both legislative chambers. Id. at 47. In 2007, an-
other amendment to Art. 76 was introduced, whereby political parties, which have 
been founded at least five consecutive years before the starting date of candidature and 
have been operating uninterruptedly for this period, and whose members have obtained 
at least 3% of the elected members of both the People’s Assembly and the Shura 
Council or what equals this total in one of the two assemblies, may nominate for presi-
dency a member of their respective higher board, according to their own by laws, pro-
vided he has been a member of such board for at least one consecutive year. See Na-
than J. Brown, Michele Dunne, & Amr Hamzawy, Egypt’s Controversial 
Constitutional Amendments, CARNEGIE INST. FOR INT’L PEACE 1, 11 (Mar. 23, 2007), 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/egypt_constitution_webcommentary01.pdf.  
 35. The 25th of January is Egypt’s National Police Day. Choosing the National Police Day 
to demonstrate and protest indicates the extent to which people in Egypt were frustrat-
ed and disappointed with the police brutality and violent practices. Egypt Braces for 
Nationwide Protests, FRANCE 24 (January 25, 2011), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110201013309/http://www.france24.com/en/20110125-
egypt-braces-nationwide-protests. 
 36. In fact, this famous revolutionary chant was a cunning selection by the protestors, as it 
mirrored their demands for a better social, economic and political life. First, “bread” 
refers to the people’s socio-economic demand for a regime that could get the country 
out of debt, offer them employment opportunities and satisfy their essential needs. Se-
cond, “freedom” describes the Egyptians’ search for their constitutional-fundamental 
rights, lost under Mubarak’s rule. Last, “social justice” was a catchall term that ac-
commodated both the economic and political deteriorated situations. Specifically, the 
term reflects the Egyptians’ desire for a regime that would maintain civil rights and 
guarantees an equitable distribution of wealth and resources. See Katie Bridget Wright, 
Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice: Understanding the Egyptian Revolution, LAKE 
FOREST C. PUBL. (2013), http://publications.lakeforest.edu/firstyear_writing_contest/1. 
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tear gas and bullets against the protesters and arresting many political 
activists.37 
After eighteen days of massive protests and demonstrations,38 on 
February 11, 2011, Vice President Omar Suleiman announced that 
 
 37. Egypt Protesters Clash with Police, AL JAZEERA (January 25, 2011, 10:26 AM), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112511362207742.html. On 
January 27, Dr. Mohamed El-Baradei, former director of the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency, returned to Egypt in order to participate in the revolution arguing that, 
“[T]he people have broken the barrier of fear. There is no going back.” Mohamed 
Elmeshad, Back in Egypt, ElBaradei Vows to Take Part in Planned Friday Demon-































 38. See Ghonim, supra note 29. During these eighteen days, Mubarak made three televised 
statements in an attempt to appease the angry protesters, yet he remained defiant, re-
fusing to step down. Mubarak’s first statement was on January 28, 2011, id. at 216, 
known as the Friday of Anger, id. at 190, which time he overthrew the government, 
named General Umar Suleiman, the head of intelligence, Vice President of Egypt, id. 
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Mubarak had decided to step down and had charged the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces (“SCAF”) to administer the country, a 
moment much awaited by the Egyptians.39  Following this withdraw-
al, Mubarak and his family were prohibited from departing the coun-
try, and he and his two sons were prosecuted under charges of cor-
ruption and of killing peaceful protestors.40  In fact, Mubarak’s trial 
 
at 216, making him the first vice president in Mubarak’s regime. Michael Slackman, 
Choice of Suleiman Likely to Please the Military, Not the Crowds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
29, 2011, at A10. (The post had remained vacant for nearly 30 years). He also imposed 
curfew in Cairo, Alexandria and Suez, deployed military forces in the three cities, and 
promised the people to undertake a huge socio-economic reform, Ghonim, supra note 
29 at 215. In fact, the impact of Mubarak’s was significant for the protestors, as they 
became sufficiently confident of Mubarak’s weakness to become more insistent upon 
the overthrow of the regime. Id. at 217. They chanted, “Al-sha ͑ab Yureed Esqaat al-
Nizam” (The People Want to Topple the Regime) which shows to what extent the 
Egyptians’ political awareness grew; they became so determined not only to force 
Mubarak to step down, but also to end the whole regime. Id. As the protestors defied 
the curfew and the severity of violence between police and protestors continued to es-
calate, Mubarak addressed the nation again on February 1, promising to ask the par-
liament to amend the constitutional articles concerning the term of presidency and 
pledging not run in the next presidential election. However, he insisted on remaining 
in power until the end of his term in September 2011. Id. at 232, ostensibly to guaran-
tee a peaceful transition of power. Once again, the protesters did not accept Mubarak’s 
speech and continued demanding that he step down. Id. As the demonstrations contin-
ued widely, on February 10, Mubarak made his third televised statement, amid great 
expectations that he would resign his office. However, in this third statement, Mubarak 
insisted that he would remain as the president until the next presidential election in 
September 2011, but also stated that he would transfer his powers to the vice president. 
Id. at 276. As a response to the stubborn Mubarak, protestors organized in massive 
marches chanting “Leave means go, in case you do not know!” The crowd headed to-
wards the presidential palace with the intention to blockade Mubarak and force him to 
step down. Once he was informed of the people’s approach, Mubarak along with his 
family, fled to Sharm el-Sheikh, an Egyptian resort city. 
 39. David Kirkpatrick, Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down,  N.Y TIMES 






40. See Patrick Kingsley, Hosni Mubarak Cleared of Conspiring to Kill Protesters in 
Egypt’s 2011 Uprising, GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2014 2:53 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/29/hosni-mubarak-cleared-conspiring-
kill-protesters-egypt-2011-uprising. See also, Jason Hanna, Sarah Sirgany & Holly 
Yan, Egypt: Ex-ruler Hosni Mubarak, Accused in Deaths of Hundreds, Cleared of 
Charges, CNN (Nov. 30, 2014 5:42 AM), 
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was the first occasion in the history of the Arab world and indeed the 
Middle East in which an overthrown president underwent a public 
trial.41 
Immediately after the overthrow of Mubarak, the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) issued a Constitutional Decla-
ration on February 13, 2011, pledging not to remain in governance 
and to hand over power to an elected civilian government within six 
months or as soon as parliamentary and presidential elections were 
held.  In addition, the Declaration suspended the 1971 Constitution 
and dissolved the two parliamentary chambers elected in 2010. Sub-
sequently, the SCAF ordered the formation of a committee to amend 
certain articles of the 1971 Constitution regarding conditions to seek 
the presidency, as well as confirming full judicial supervision over 
both parliamentary and presidential elections.42  The amendments al-
so included a description of the road map describing how power 
would be transferred to an elected civilian government by virtue of a 
parliamentary election followed by a presidential election.43 Further, 
the amendments stipulated that the parliament should elect a constit-
uent assembly to draft the country’s new constitution.  The amend-
ments were put into a popular referendum and approved by 77% on 
March 19, 2011.44 On March 30, 2011, the SCAF issued a constitu-
tional declaration including the approved amendments.45 
 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/29/world/meast/egypt-mubarak-trial/. On June 2, 2012, a 
criminal court acquitted Mubarak of ordering protesters to be killed. However, the 
Court found him guilty of not ordering the killing to be stopped, and sentenced him to 
life imprisonment. Likewise, the court found Habib el-Adly, the former Minister of In-
terior, guilty of conspiring to kill the protestors, also sentencing him to life imprison-
ment However, Mubarak appealed the verdict, and the Court of Cassation granted him 
the appeal and ordered a retrial, in which he was acquitted later. Id. 
 41. Ilhem Allagui & Johanne Kuebler, The Arab Spring and the Role of ICTs: Editorial 
Introduction, 5 INT’L J. COMMC’N 1435, 1439 (2011). 
 42. James Feuille, Reforming Egypt’s Constitution: Hope for Egyptian Democracy?, 47 
TEX. INT’L L. J. 237, 247 (2011). 
 43. Id.  
 44. Egypt Referendum Strongly Backs Constitution Changes, BBC (March 20, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12801125. 
 45. The 2011 Declaration was amended twice. The first amendment was adopted on Sep-
tember 25, 2011, and stipulated that one-third of the parliamentary seats were to be 
filled by individual candidates, while two-thirds were to be filled by proportional lists. 
The second amendment took place on November 19, 2011, and required ambassadors 
and consuls to supervise the elections abroad, as it would be difficult for judges to 
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After the 2011 Revolution, Islamists in Egypt started to emerge 
as a major political power especially Al-ikhwan Al-moslumin (the 
Muslim Brotherhood).  Following the revolution, the Muslim Broth-
erhood decided to practice politics in an organized form, and so es-
tablished a political party, Hezb Al-horya w Al- ͑adalah (The Freedom 
and Justice Party).46  The Muslim Brotherhood became highly in-
volved in political life, after having been during Mubarak’s regime a 
banned group whose members were always prosecuted.47  The deci-
sive electoral victory in the 2011 parliamentary elections was the first 
occasion upon which the Brotherhood showed its canines.48  Under 
the flag of their new party, Hezb Al-Nour (The Light Party), the 
Salafists49 were fairly represented in the parliament,50 which guaran-
teed to the Islamists full control over the lower house.51  On June 24, 
2012, with a 51.73% of vote,52 Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim 
Brotherhood53 was sworn as Egypt’s first democratically elected pres-
 
travel abroad to ensure judicial supervision. Nathan J. Brown & Kristen Stilt, A Hap-
hazard Constitutional Compromise, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Apr. 11, 
2011), http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/11/haphazard-constitutional-
compromise. 
 46. Mohamed Abdelaal, Egypt’s Constitution: What Went Wrong?, 7 VIENNA J. ON INT’L 
CONST. L. 200, 203 (2013). 
 47. Id.; see also Sahar F. Aziz, Egypt’s Protracted Revolution, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 2, 3 
(2012). 
 48. Despite its proclamation that it would not run for more than 30% of the seats, the Mus-
lim Brotherhood ran for 70% of the seats in the People’s Assembly (the lower house) 
and won almost 50% of the seats. Sahar F. Aziz, Egypt’s Protracted Revolution, 19 
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 2, 4 (2012). 
 49. According to Islamic jurisprudence, the word salaf refers to the earliest Muslims, i.e., 
Prophet Muhammad’s companions and their followers. Thus, technically, Salafists are 
those who call for the understanding of Islam and its sources according to the approach 
of the earliest Muslims, simply because they consider this approach to be the true Is-
lam and free of foreign influence and interpretation. In Egypt, Salafists are considered 
among the most extreme Islamists. Id. at 3. 
 50. The Salafists won 25% of the seats in the People’s Assembly. Abdelaal, supra note 46.  
 51. Aziz, supra note 48. 
 52. David Kirkpatrick, Muslim Brotherhood’s Mursi declared Egypt president, BBC (June 
24, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-18571580. 
 53. Indeed, the Brotherhood initially nominated Khairat El-Shater, a prominent leader and 
the deputy chairman of Brotherhood, as its first presidential candidate.  However, El-
Shater was disqualified by the 2012 Presidential Election Commission due to the legal 
requirement that a released prisoner is not eligible to practice his political rights before 
six years has elapsed from the time of his release.  Consequently, the Muslim Brother-
hood introduced Mohamed Morsi as the alternate presidential candidate.  Id.  
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ident after the 2011 Revolution.54  In the same year, the Islamist-
dominated parliament elected a Constituent Assembly to draft a new 
constitution for the country.55  The Assembly witnessed a boycott 
movement from some of Egypt’s liberal figures and parties in objec-
tion to the Islamists’ dominance over its formation.56  On December 
26, 2012, the constitution was put to popular referendum where it 
was approved by 63.8% with a population turnout of only 33%.57  In 
fact, the constitution was sharply criticized by many Egyptians and 
political activists for restricting rights and introducing a theocratic 
rule.58  However, Islamists argued that the 2012 Constitution was su-
perior to all of Egypt’s previous constitutions, and asserted that it 
achieves great progress in the fields of individuals’ rights and free-
doms, social justice,  restricting presidential powers, and limiting the 
presidential term.59  
B. Impeachment in the 2012 Constitution 
Article 152 of the 2012 Constitution established presidential im-
peachment by stating: 
A charge of felony or treason against the President of the 
Republic is to be based on a motion signed by at least one-
 
 54. Evan Hill, The villa and the ministry, AL JAZEERA (June 18, 2012), 
http://blogs.aljazeera.com/blog/middleeast/villa-and-ministry. 
 55. The 2012 Constituent Assembly was composed of 100 members−39 seats for parlia-
mentary members and 61 seats for independent members (6 seats for judges, 13 seats 
for labor unions, 21 seats for public figures, 9 seats for law experts, 5 seats for the Al-
Azhar institute, 4 seats for the Coptic Orthodox Church, a seat for the armed forces, a 
seat for the police, and a seat for the Ministry of Justice).  The Assembly was heavily 
dominated by the Islamists.  Specifically, Islamic parties, with 16 seats for the Free-
dom and Justice Party (the Muslim Brotherhood’s party) and 8 seats for the Light Par-
ty (the Salafists’ party), comprised 24 out of the 39 parliamentary seats.  Further, the 
Islamists desperately sought for the nine seats of the law experts to be filled by those 
who belong ideologically to the Islamic bloc in Egypt. Abdelaal, supra note 46, at 203 
n.18. 
 56. For instance, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Hezb Al-Karama (The Dignity Party), and the 
Coptic Orthodox Church announced their withdrawal from the Assembly in objection 
to the Islamists’ dominance. Id. 
 57. Id. at 200 n.2. 
 58. For more information see Mohamed Abdelaal, Egypt’s Constitution: What Went 
Wrong?, 7 VIENNA J. ON INT’L CONST. L. 200, 203 (2013). 
 59. Abdelaal, supra note 46. 
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third of the members of the House or Representatives.60  A 
decision to impeach is to be issued only by a two-thirds ma-
jority vote of the members of the House of Representa-
tives.61  As soon as an impeachment decision is reached, the 
president ceases all work.  This should be treated a tempo-
rary impediment that prevents the President of the Republic 
from assuming his responsibilities.62 
At the outset, Article 152 listed high treason and felony as two 
offenses that merit impeachment if committed by the president.63  Un-
like Article 85 of the 1971 Constitution, which extended the scope of 
impeachable offenses to include high treason or any criminal crime, 
Article 152 limits the scope to include only high treason or felony.64  
Regarding the first offense, given that Article 152 failed to define the 
crime of high treason and that Law No. 247/1956 lacks a definition,65 
the definition of a high treason crime should be determined according 
to the penal code as well as Law No. 79/1958, regarding the prosecu-
 
 60. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 152. 
 61. Id. 
 62. According to Article 153, “if a temporary impediment prevents the President from ex-
ercising his duties, the Prime Minister takes over his responsibilities.” Id. at art. 153. 
Thus, since Article 152 treats presidential impeachment as a “temporary impediment,” 
the prime minister should assume the presidency until a verdict is reached in the im-
peachment case. Id. at art. 152.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id.; CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, Sept. 11, 1971, as amended, May 






65. Law No. 247/1956 served under the Constitution of 1956 and regulated the trial of the 
president and the ministers.  It impeached the president for the commission of treason 
or disloyalty to the republic regime, and listed acts of disloyalty to the republic regime 
to be: (a) seeking to overthrow the republic regime in favor of a monarchy; 
(b) or suspending all or part of the country’s constitution or amending its provisions without 
following the terms and rules prescribed in the constitution.  However, it did not define 
what is meant by the crime of treason as an impeachable offense.  According to the 
explanatory memorandum of the law, acts that constitute the crime of treason are to be 
determined according to provisions of the penal code.  Law No. 247 of 1956, Al-
Jarida al-Rismiyyah, 14 June 1956 (Egypt).  
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tion of ministers in both the Egyptian and Syrian territories, after 
Egypt had entered a political union with Syria in 1958.66 
On the other hand, Article 152 listed felony as the second cate-
gory of impeachable offense.  As mentioned above, the Egyptian pe-
nal code classifies crimes as felonies, misdemeanors, or violations, 
and it defines felonies as crimes that are punished with death, life im-
prisonment, aggravated imprisonment, and imprisonment.67  Conse-
quently, according to Article 152, impeachment procedures should be 
invoked against the president if he commits a crime that is punishable 
by death, life imprisonment, aggravated imprisonment, or imprison-
ment. 
Regarding the question of how to impeach, the 2012 Constitution 
followed that of 1971 by Article 152’s requirement that at least one-
third of the members of the House of Representatives support the im-
peachment resolution against the president to be considered, and that 
an impeachment decision against him requires a two-thirds majority 
vote to pass.68  As mentioned earlier, the requirement of special ma-
jorities is likely to hinder any attempt to render the executive ac-
countable for his misconduct, since such majorities are required just 
to submit an impeachment resolution and to indict.69  Indeed, the role 
of the investigation committee found in Article 10 of Law No. 
247/1956, to investigate the impeachment resolution and ensure its 
seriousness, is likely to help prevent malicious resolutions without 
requiring a special majority to submit such resolutions in the legisla-
 
 66. Law No. 79/1958 was issued by a presidential decree with the force of law on June 22, 
1958, and replaced the provisions of Law No. 247/1956 regarding the prosecution of 
ministers.  The law did not address the possibility to impeach the president; however, 
it only called for impeaching ministers if they committed certain crimes such as,  “(1) 
high treason; (2) violation of the basic provisions in the constitution; (3) any act or be-
havior that causes an increase or decrease in prices of commodities, real estate, gov-
ernmental securities, or securities of the stock markets to obtain a personal benefit or 
for a third party; (4) influence peddling; (5) deliberate violation of laws and regula-
tions that costs the state or a public domain entity a financial loss; (6) any act or be-
havior that means an interference in the work of the judiciary or any entity with judi-
cial jurisdiction; and (7) interference in the election or the referendum process to direct 
its result either by issuing illegal orders or using illegal procedures.” Law No. 79 of 
1958, al-Jarida al-Rismiyyah, 22 June 1958 (Egypt).  
 67. Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), al-Jarida al-
Rismiyyah, Aug. 1937 (Egypt). 
 68. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 152. 
 69. Id. 
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tive chamber.70  Likewise, a two-thirds majority to indict the execu-
tive could be a further obstacle to thwart the impeachment process, 
especially if such a special majority is required to convict. 
In determining the court of impeachment, it should be noted that 
the 2012 Constitution followed that of 1971 in establishing a bicam-
eral legislature, the House of Representatives and the Shura Coun-
cil.71  However, unlike the 1971 Constitution, which assigns the 
Shura Council with only consultative functions, the 2012 Constitu-
tion followed that of 1971 in establishing a bicameral legislature, the 
House of Representatives and the Shura Council.72  However, unlike 
the 1971 Constitution which assigns the Shura Council with only 
consultative functions, the 2012 Constitution expands the functions 
of the Shura Council to include passing laws,73 assuming legislative 
powers that were previously shared with the House of Representa-
tives in case this latter is dissolved,74 and approving the presidential 
appointments of the chairmen of the independent bodies and supervi-
sory organs.75 
However, the 2012 Constitution did not designate the Shura 
Council as the court of impeachment to try the president after being 
impeached by the House of Representatives; rather, it assigned a spe-
cial tribunal for this task.76  Specifically, Article 152 stipulates: 
The President of the Republic is to be tried before a special 
court headed by the President of the High Council of Judges 
and staffed by the senior deputies of the President of the Su-
preme Constitutional Court and the State Council, and the 
two most senior presidents of the appeals courts.  The Public 
Prosecutor assumes the role of prosecutor.  If the most sen-
ior person is unable to play his part, the person next in sen-
iority takes his place.77  
 
 70. Law No. 247 of 1956, Al-Jarida al-Rismiyyah, 14 June 1956 (Egypt). 
 71. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 82. 
 72. “The legislative power consists of the House of Representatives and the Consultative 
Assembly.  Each exercises its authority in accordance with the Constitution.” Id. 
 73. Id. at art. 102. 
 74. Id. at art. 131. 
 75. Id. at art. 202. 
 76. Id. at art. 152. 
 77. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 152. 
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In fact, a cursory examination of this special court reveals that it 
has a predominantly judicial formation.  Unlike, Article one of Law 
No. 247/1956, which designated a special court of twelve members 
(half of them are parliamentary members) to try the president, the 
court of impeachment designated by Article 152 of the 2012 Consti-
tution did not include any parliamentary representation. 
Once again, Article 152 reduced the parliamentary role in the 
impeachment trial when it assigned the Public Prosecutor the task of 
presenting the case against the president instead of requiring the 
House of Representatives to appoint managers to do so.78  In practice, 
designating the Public Prosecutor to present the impeachment case 
against the president is likely to hurt the neutrality of the case.  More 
precisely, according to Article 173, the Public Prosecutor is appoint-
ed by the president upon a recommendation from the Supreme Coun-
cil of Judges.79  Consequently, the president is directly involved in the 
appointment of the Public Prosecutor who would present the case of 
impeachment against him, a situation that confers considerable doubt 
upon the neutrality of the impeachment process.80 
In determining punishments for impeachment, Article 152 re-
quires the law should specify the sentence; however, if convicted, the 
president is to be removed from office.  Thus, according to the arti-
cle, punishment for impeachment would be removal from office in 
addition to sanctions prescribed in law, which in this case would be 
 
 78. Id.  
 79. Article 173 required the Supreme Council of Judges to choose the Public Prosecutor 
from among the deputies to the President of the Court of Cassation, the presidents of 





80. Indeed, one can argue that according to Article 173, the Supreme Council of Judges 
plays the vital role in the process of appointing the Public Prosecutor by choosing him, 
and that the role of the president is limited to issuing a presidential decree to enforce 
the choice.  However, in fact, a careful examination of Article 173 reveals that the pro-
cess of appointing the Public Prosecutor requires that two different actors take two 
separate actions: (1) the Supreme Council of Judges to choose, (2) and the president to 
enforce the choice through a presidential decree.  Thus, the presidential role in such 
appointment is evident and indeed indispensable given that the Article 173 did not ad-
dress the case of who should prevail if the president refuses the choice of the Supreme 
Council of Judges. Id.  
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the penal code as well as Law No. 247/1956.81  The penal code gov-
erns punishment for felonies−death, life imprisonment, aggravated 
imprisonment, or imprisonment.82  On the other hand, Law No. 
247/1956 sets the punishment for high treason−death or life or aggra-
vated imprisonment.83  Adopting the approach of the previous consti-
tutions, Article 152 ignored any mention of disqualification as a pos-
sible punishment for impeachment; however, as mentioned above, 
according to Article 25 of the penal code, disqualification is an ancil-
lary penalty that should be imposed in case of a felony conviction.84 
It is evident that Article 152 failed to confirm the political nature 
of the impeachment process.  Specifically, the article neglected to de-
fine the crime of high treason as an impeachable offense against the 
president, making referral to the penal code and Law No. 247/1956, 
which lists criminal punishments for high treason, inevitable.  Fur-
ther, the article’s approach in designating the court of impeachment 
with a purely judicial formation, lacking any parliamentary represen-
tation, raises considerable doubts, i.e., whether the impeachment pro-
cess is of a political nature in that it requires the involvement of the 
people’s representatives in the trial of the president; or whether it is 
of a criminal nature in that a regular judicial court is sufficient to try 
the president. 
In fact, the 2012 Constitution would have been an ideal oppor-
tunity to adopt an impeachment clause to ensure the political ac-
countability of the president, not only because it was the outcome of 
a popular uprising that toppled a defiant dictator, but also because it 
maximized the political role to be played by the president.  More pre-
cisely, the Constitution designated the president as an arbiter between 
the three governmental powers when Article 132 assigned him the 
role of maintaining separation of powers.85 
The concept of presidential arbitration was first introduced by 
President Charles de Gaulle of France and was adopted in the French 
 
 81. Id. at art. 152.  
 82. Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), al-Jarida al-
Rismiyyah, Aug. 1937 (Egypt). 
 83. Law No. 247 of 1956, al-Jarida al-Rismiyyah, 14 June 1956 (Egypt). 
 84. Law No. 58 of 1937 (Criminal Code of 1937, reformed in 1952), al-Jarida al-
Rismiyyah, Aug. 1937, art. 25 (Egypt). 
 85. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 132. 
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Constitution of 1958.86  According to this concept, the president was 
assigned a new role and thereby became more involved in political 
life of the nation as his role developed from merely guaranteeing the 
safeguards to enable each power to function properly, to becoming an 
actual arbiter between them.87  Consequently, the political accounta-
bility of the president should have been raised to a level commensu-
rate with his new political role, in order to help curb any official mis-
conduct. 
Ironically, the 2012 Constitution included a clause that is likely 
to relieve the president from most of his political accountability.88  
According to Article 141, the president assumes his powers through 
the prime minister and the prime minister’s deputies and ministers, 
except for powers of defense, national security, foreign policy, ap-
pointing the prime minister and civilian and military public officials, 
representing the state and concluding treaties, declaring war and 
emergency, issuing pardons and reducing sentences.89  Accordingly, 
this article assumes two scenarios, both of which negate the political 
accountability of the president.90 First, the article could be construed 
to mean that powers − such as dissolving the parliament, enforcing 
laws, setting out the state’s public policy, and issuing presidential de-
crees with the power of law − are to be performed only by the prime 
minister, his deputies, or the ministers, without there being any role 
for the president.91  In this scenario, the cabinet would be solely ac-
countable for the consequences of such actions.92  Alternatively, the 
article could be interpreted as designating the cabinet to be the prin-
 
86. “The President of the Republic shall ensure due respect for the Constitution. He shall 
ensure, by his arbitration, the proper functioning of the public authorities and the con-
tinuity of the State. He shall be the guarantor of national independence, territorial in-
tegrity and due respect for Treaties.” FRENCH CONSTITUTION OF 1958, Art. 5. 
 87. MICHEL BELANCER, CONTRIBUTION A L’ETUDE DE LA RESPONSABILITE POLITIQUE DU 
CHEF DE L’ETAT 1276 (1979). 
 88. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 141. 
 89. Nariman Youssef, Egypt’s Draft Constitution Translated, EGYPT INDEP. (Feb. 12, 
2012), art.166, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-
translated. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Zaid Al-Ali, The Constitutional Court’s Mark on Egypt’s elections, FOREIGN POL’Y 
(Jun. 6, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/06/the-constitutional-courts-mark-on-
egypts-elections.  
 92. Youssef, supra note 89. 
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cipal, and delegating those powers to the president.  Consequently, if 
the president committed misconduct during his exercise of the dele-
gated powers, the responsibility would be divided between him and 
the principal (cabinet), and the latter would bear most of it.93 
Finally, regarding ministerial impeachment, Article 166 of the 
2012 Constitution granted the President, the Public Prosecutor, and 
one-third of the House of Representatives the right to submit a mo-
tion to impeach the prime minister or a member of the cabinet for 
crimes committed during or because of their tenure, whereas a deci-
sion to impeach can only be issued by two-thirds of the membership 
of the House of Representatives.94 It is evident that the article did not 
list impeachable offenses; however, according to Law No. 79/1958, 
members of the cabinet can be impeached for the following reasons: 
high treason, violation of the basic provisions in the constitution, ma-
nipulation of prices of commodities, real estates, governmental secu-
rities, or securities of the stock markets to obtain a personal benefit or 
for a third party, influence peddling, violation of laws and regulations 
that costs the state or a public domain entity a financial loss, interfer-
ence in the work of the judiciary or any entity with judicial jurisdic-
tion, or interference in the election or the referendum process to di-
rect its result either by issuing illegal orders or taking illegal 
procedures.95 
Further, the article required the impeached official to stop all 
work until a verdict is reached and stated that termination of his ser-
vice does not preclude a prosecution.  Ultimately, since the article did 
not determine the court of impeachment and the trial procedures, Law 
No. 79/1958 should govern these issues.  
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 
 95. First: Political Headlines, ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
(Jun. 8, 2006), 
http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/MediaCenter/ForeignMedia/Pages/PressDetails.aspx?
Source=6781921f-3993-444a-859e-ee26ce851de8&newsID=0500a298-e562-48af-
a08c-cc8d2f0341b1; Law No. 46 of 1972 (Civil Code), al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 28 Oct. 
1972, No. 77(2) & 119 (Egypt). 
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The Constitution of 2014 
A. Background 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s gateway into Egypt’s political life 
was the 2011 Revolution. After their recognition as a banned group 
during Mubarak’s era changed to a recognized political power, they 
established a political party (The Freedom and Justice Party), which 
dominated the 2012 parliament with the Salafists, and their candidate 
Mohamed Morsi winning the presidency.96 
However, right from the start, it seemed that Morsi’s days in the 
presidency were limited. Morsi’s dramatic fall started with his 2012 
Constitutional Declaration.  On November 22, 2012, Morsi issued a 
constitutional declaration immunizing the Constituent Assembly re-
sponsible for drafting the 2012 Constitution from being dissolved by 
the judiciary, as well as immunizing its work from being challenged 
in courts,97 in violation of the 2011 Constitutional Declaration issued 
by the SCAF that it would serve as the country’s fundamental law 
pending the drafting of a new constitution.98  Moreover, the declara-
tion dismissed the Prosecutor General Abdul Majid Mahmoud, who 
was appointed by Mubarak, and replaced him with one of Morsi’s al-
lies in violation of the Judicial Authority Act.99  Morsi’s declaration 
ordered a retrial for those accused of killing the protesters in Mubar-
ak’s era by the Egyptian courts.100  Further, the declaration immun-
ized Morsi’s presidential decrees from judicial oversight101 and au-
thorized him to take any necessary measures to protect the 
revolution.102 
 
 96. Freedom and Justice Party, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2015), 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/Freedom-and-Justice-Party. 
 97. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 5. 
 98. “The text of law forbids any action or administrative decision from being absolved of 
judicial oversight.” CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 23 Mar. 2011, 
art. 21.  
 99. Id. at art. 3. “The Supreme Judicial Council considers all matters related to the ap-
pointment, promotion, transference, delegation, and loaning of judges and public pros-
ecutors .  [T]he General Prosecutor could [resign his office] asking to return to the ju-
diciary.” Law No. 46 of 1972 (Civil Code), al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 28 Oct. 1972, No. 
77(2) & 119 (Egypt). 
 100. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 1. 
 101. Id. at art. 2.  
 102. Id. at art. 6. 
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Indeed, the 2012 Constitutional Declaration’s approach in im-
munizing presidential decrees, the work of the Constituent Assembly, 
from judicial oversight, and dismissing the prosecutor general and 
ordering a retrial for those who had been previously acquitted, upset 
the general public and lead to massive protest movements against 
President Morsi.103 Likewise, the declaration aroused the anger of the 
judiciary to such an extent that the Supreme Judicial Council stated 
the declaration was an “unprecedented assault on the independence of 
the judiciary and its rulings.”104 
In response to the declaration, Gabihet al-enkaz al-watani (Na-
tional Salvation Front), a coalition of certain liberal parties and polit-
ical figures, was formed.105  The Front asked Morsi to rescind the 
declaration and claimed that he lost legitimacy when he refused to do 
so.106  Later on, under the pressure of wide protests, Morsi agreed to 
amend the declaration and to limit the scope of his immunized de-
crees to include only “sovereign matters.”107  Further, he agreed that 
there would be retrials for those who had been previously acquitted 
only if new evidence was presented.108 Nevertheless, these conces-
sions did not sufficiently quell public outrage against Morsi. 
In fact, it was not only the 2012 Constitutional Declaration that 
outraged the general public against president Morsi. The 2012 Con-
 
 103. Mohamed El Baradei described the declaration as follows, “Morsi today usurped all 
state powers & appointed himself Egypt’s new pharaoh.” Michael Birnbaum, Egypt’s 
President Morsi takes sweeping new powers, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2012), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-22/world/35512324_1_morsi-new-
powers-muslim-brotherhood. 
 104. Egypt’s Top Judges Slam Morsi’s New Powers, BBC NEWS (Nov. 24, 2012), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57553859/egypts-top-judges-slam-morsis-
new-powers/?pageNum=2. 
 105. Profile: Egypt’s National Salvation Front, BBC (Dec.10, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20667661. The National Salvation Front 
was formed on November 22, 2012, in response to the 2012 Constitutional Declara-
tion. The Front included a coalition of thirty-five political parties as well as political 
figures and activists, all of whom belonged to the liberal-leftist bloc. The Front signifi-
cantly contributed to mobilizing the public opinion against Morsi and the whole re-
gime by heavily criticizing his policies. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Egypt: Who Holds Power?, BBC (July 3, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-18779934. 
 108. Mohamed Fadel Fahmy & Jason Hanna, Egypt’s Morsi Says Court Can’t Overturn 
Him, CNN (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/22/world/meast/egypt-
morsy-powers/. 
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stitution itself significantly contributed in escalation of the outrage.  
Many Egyptians doubted the legitimacy of the 2012 Constitution for 
several reasons including the low approval rating and population 
turnout in the referendum, several boycott movements from the liber-
al bloc, the widely disseminated message that the constitution re-
stricted freedoms and imposed a strict religious ideology, and the Is-
lamists’ dominance over the formation of the Constituent Assembly.  
Morsi’s poor performance as a ruler made matters even worse.  
According to Morsi’s opponents, he desperately attempted to erase 
Egypt’s moderate-diverse identity through his approach in Akhwanet 
“Brotherhooding”109 the country by favoring his party’s fellows and 
appointing them to leadership positions.110  Moreover, Morsi defiant-
ly ignored the several calls, prompted by its apparent poor perfor-
mance failure to meet the people’s economic demands and expecta-
tions, to dismiss the government..111  Further, police brutality 
persisted during Morsi’s regime.112 
 
 109. Matt Bradley & Reem Abdellatif, Five Things to Know About Egypt Protests, WALL 
ST. J. (July 1, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2013/07/01/five-things-to-know-
about-egypt-protests/. 
 110. Tara Rhodes, Protests in a New Perspective: A Discourse Analysis of the Arab Spring, 







111. Dahlia Kholaif, Morsi’s downfall hammers Hamas, AL-JAZEERA (July 10, 2013), 
 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/07/2013710113757741999.html. 
On July 24, 2012, President Morsi appointed Hesham Qandil as Egypt’s prime minis-
ter. Besides the fact that Qandil’s appointment was met with tremendous objections 
due to his inexperience, Qandil’s cabinet also displayed a pitiful performance in deal-
ing with Egypt’s economic and political challenges. For instance, instead of focusing 
on how to develop and use the country’s resources, the cabinet depended on foreign 
subsidies and aid, especially from Qatar, and entered negotiations with the Internation-
al Monetary Fund to provide the country with a $4.8 billion dollar loan. Further, the 
cabinet proved a great dismal failure on the diplomatic front, when it failed to reach an 
agreement with Ethiopia regarding Sad Al-nahda (Renaissance Dam), which is be-
lieved to be causing a significant reduction of water availability in Egypt. On July 3, 
2013, an Egyptian appeals court upheld a verdict dismissing Qandil’s cabinet and sen-
tencing him to one year in prison for refusing to execute a judicial judgment to re-
nationalize Tanta Flax and Oil Company after it was sold to private interests in 2005. 
During Qandil’s cabinet, Egyptians continued to suffer from high prices, fuel shortag-
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The deteriorating security state in the country must also not be 
overlooked.  Morsi was blamed for failing to restore security after the 
chaotic conditions that followed the 2011 Revolution. In fact, the se-
curity situation became even worse during his regime.113 Many Egyp-
tians attributed blame for worsening the nation’s security to Morsi 
when he granted presidential pardon for Islamist extremists con-
victs,114 including Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group), a 
 
es, and power outages. Many Egyptians and analysts claimed that as a result of Mor-
si’s friendly relations with the Hamas government, he had allowed fuel to be smuggled 
out through the underground tunnels in Sinai to the Gaza Strip, which caused the fuel 
shortages and power outages in Egypt. Id.  
112. Yolande Knell, Egypt police beating: The strange case of Hamada Saber, BBC (Feb. 
4, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21330132; Egypt protester 
El-Gendy was tortured: Security sources, AHRAM ONLINE (Feb. 6, 2013), 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/64151/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-protester-
ElGendy-was-tortured-Security-sour.aspx. For instance, on February 1, 2013, protest-
ers against president Morsi marched to Itahadia, the presidential palace asking Morsi 
to resign his office and allow early presidential election. The protesters clashed with 
the police forces as well as Morsi’s supporters. The police showed excessive force, us-
ing tear gases and snipers against the protesters. Moreover, on February 3, 2013, the 
Egyptian media unveiled a video of a man who had been stripped naked, dragged, and 
beaten by the police before being put in a police van. The man, who was identified as 
an unemployed fifty-year-old named Hamada Saber, appeared on state television from 
a police hospital where he claimed that he was beaten by protesters who took his mon-
ey and clothes. However, after he was moved to a public hospital, he changed his tes-
timony, claiming that he was beaten and stripped naked by the police forces and that 
he had been forced to give false testimony, as he feared further police abuse. Further, 
On February 4, 2013, Mohamed El-gendy, a political activist, died in a hospital be-
cause of the grave injuries he suffered after being arrested, detained, and tortured by 
the police.  Id. 
 
 
113. Martin Chulov &Patrick Kingsley, Mohamed Morsi ousted in Egypt’s second revolu-
tion in two years, GUARDIAN (July 4, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egypt-second-
revolution.  
 114. In fact, many of the released Islamist convicts were responsible for the hate speeches 
against Egypt’s Christians and anti-Morsi activists. Indeed, these Islamists tried to im-
plant in the people’s minds that those who oppose Morsi in fact oppose Islam and 
God’s rule. Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, The Jihadist Threat in Egypt’s Sinai, AL-
MONITOR: THE PULSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST (July 22, 2013), http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/jihad-threat-egypt-sinai.html.  
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prominent extremist Islamic group,115 and allowing them into Egypt’s 
social and political life.116 
In April 2013, Morsi continued to ignore the public outrage as 
the severity of violence continued to escalate.  A political youth ac-
tivist group founded Haraket Tamarod (Rebel Movement) with the 
intention of collecting signatures calling for President Morsi to step 
down and allow an early presidential election.117 After announcing 
that it had successfully secured more than twenty-two million signa-
tures against the regime,118 Tamarod called for massive demonstra-
tions on June 30, the first anniversary of Morsi’s inauguration, in 
Tahrir Square and around the presidential palace.119  By June 30, mil-
lions of Egyptians flooded the streets nationwide in rage over Morsi’s 
regime, and the popular chant Al-sha ͑ab Yureed Esqaat al-Nizam 
(“The people want to topple the regime”) could be heard loudly.120  
Amid these circumstances, on July 1, the Commander-In-Chief of the 
Egyptian Armed Forces General Abdul Fattah el-Sisi issued a 48-
hour ultimatum, giving Morsi until July 3 to reach a political com-
 
115. Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (“the Group”) was founded in the early 1970 in Egypt for the 
purpose of jihad, establishing an Islamic state and reviving the Caliphate system. The 
Group’s activity was always accompanied with by extreme violence. For example, the 
Group was responsible for the assassination of President Sadat in 1981 and for the kill-
ing of more than 100 policemen and soldiers in Asyut city in southern Egypt. Further, 
in 1997, the Group was responsible for the Luxor massacre of least 62 people, most 
whom were Swiss tourists, in Luxor city. The United States and the European Union 
list Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya as a terrorism group. Tom Perry, Egypt’s Mursi frees Is-
lamists jailed by Mubarak, REUTERS (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/31/us-egypt-mursi-pardon-
idUSBRE86U13K20120731. 
 116. For instance, on June 17, 2013, President Morsi appointed Adel el-Khayat, an Islam-
ists who belongs to Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, as governor of Luxor, a major tourism 
city in Egypt. In fact, the appointment sparked the anger of the Egyptians since it is 
know that Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya was linked to the Luxor massacre. Id. 
 117. Mbaye Lo, Morsi, the last caliph-president of Egypt, MONDOWEISS (July 28, 2013), 
http://mondoweiss.net/2013/07/morsi-the-last-caliph-president-of-egypt.  
 118. Nada Hussein Rashwan, Egypt’s ‘Rebel’ Campaign Gathered 22 mn Signatures, Says 
Spokesman, AHRAM ONLINE (June 29, 2013), 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/75244/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-Rebel-
campaign-gathered—mn-signatures,-say.aspx.  
 119. Egypt on the Brink: Nationwide Protests Call for Morsi’s Ouster, N.Y. POST (June 30, 
2013), http://nypost.com/2013/06/30/egypt-on-the-brink-nationwide-protests-call-for-
morsis-ouster/.  
 120. Id.  
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promise and meet the demands of the people.121  The following day, 
as the Army’s ultimatum deadline approached, Morsi addressed the 
nation rejecting the Army’s ultimatum and refusing to resign declar-
ing “he would defend legitimacy and his office with his life”122 
By the end of the ultimatum and under the pressure of massive 
demonstrations, on July 3, General El-Sisi announced that Morsi was 
removed from power.123  Further, General El-Sisi announced the sus-
pension of the 2012 Constitution and installed Chief Justice Adly 
Mansour as an interim president during a transition period until a new 
constitution could be drafted and new presidential and parliamentary 
elections could be held.124 
Following his ousting, Morsi was arrested and detained.125  Fur-
ther, the Egyptian Public Prosecution Authority charged him and 
leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood with inciting police forces and 
their allies to kill the protesters,126 and with collaboration with a for-
eign entity to escape from prison after the 2011 Revolution.127 Morsi 
 
 121. Salma Abdelaziz, Reza Sayah & Ben Wedeman, Egypt’s military gives Morsy ultima-
tum, CNN (July 2, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/01/world/meast/egypt-
protests/index.html?hpt=hp_t1.  
 122. Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi Defiant as Protest Deaths Rise, BBC  (July 3, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23154233. In fact, Morsi’s opponents 
saw this statement as the green light to his supporters and allies to crack down on his 
protesters and demonstrators. Likewise, many analysts as well as political activists in-
terpreted the president’s statement to mean a call for a civil war. Id.  
 123. David Kirkpatrick, Army Ousts Egypt’s President; Morsi is Taken Into Military Cus-
tody, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html?_r=0. 
 124. Id. 
 125. What’s Become of Egypt’s Morsi, BBC (June 16, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24772806. 
 126. The Prosecution Authority based the accusation against Morsi on the events that took 
place in December 2012, when masses of protesters organized a sit-in at the presiden-
tial palace and the security forces were so reluctant to protect the palace. Consequent-
ly, leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood called their supporters to defend the palace and 
the president. As president Morsi did nothing regarding this call, many of the Brother-
hood and the president supporters attacked the protestors causing many injuries and 
deaths among them. Id.  
 127. During the events of the 2011 Revolution, on January 28, president Morsi was arrested 
and detained in Wadi el-Natroun, before being released along with some fellows in the 
Muslim Brotherhood two days later under suspicious circumstances. Indeed, amid the 
chaotic atmosphere that accompanied the 2011 Revolution, many prisons were broken 
into by unknown people and thousands of prisoners, including president Morsi, were 
able to escape. In June 2013, while investigating a case against an inmate who had 
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made his first appearance in court on November 4, 2013, making him 
the second Egyptian president to be criminally prosecuted in almost 
three years.128 
Pursuant to a constitutional declaration issued on July 8, 2013, a 
ten-member committee of legal experts was formed by a presidential 
decree to amend the Constitution of 2012 before having these 
amendments discussed by a fifty-member committee representing 
major stakeholders in Egyptian society.129 The amended constitution-
al copy was approved in a public referendum in January 2014.130 
B. Impeachment in the 2014 Constitution 
Article 159 of the 2014 Constitution provides,  
 A charge of violating the provisions of the Constitution, 
high treason or any other felony against the President of the 
Republic is to be based on a motion signed by at least a ma-
jority of the members of the House of Representatives. An 
impeachment can only be issued by a two-thirds majority of 
the members of the House of Representatives and after an 
investigation to be carried out by the Prosecutor General. If 
there is an impediment, he is to be replaced by one of his as-
sistants.131 
 
fled, and after hearing the testimonies of police officials and intelligence agents, Ismai-
lia Criminal Court blamed the Palestinian militant group Hamas for helping the pris-
oners to escape during the revolution including those detained in Wadi el-Natroun. 
Further, the Court emphasized that strong evidence confirms that president Morsi and 
the Brotherhood’s leaders conspired with Hamas for the jailbreak. Id.  
 128. Kirkpatrick, supra note 123.  
 129. According to Article 28 of the declaration, two members of the Supreme Constitution-
al Court and its College of Commissioners, and two of the judges of the State Council, 
and four constitutional law professors should be represented in the Committee of Ten. 
Article 29 provided that members of the Committee of Fifty should represent Political 
parties, Workers, Peasants, Members of Labor Unions and Federations, National 
Councils, Churches, Al-Azhar, Armed Forces, Police, and Public figures. Also, the 
committee should include at least ten youth from both sexes. Mohamed Abdelaal, Re-
forming the Constitution of Egypt: An Ugly Institutional Competition, C.J.I.C.L. (Mar. 
25, 2015), http://cjicl.org.uk/2015/03/25/reforming-the-constitution-of-egypt-an-ugly-
institutional-competition/. 
 130. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014. 
 131. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 159. 
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At the outset, it seems that Article 159 follows the same im-
peachment mechanism found in Article 152 of the 2012 Constitution, 
with only two slight differences regarding the impeachable offenses 
and the majority rule required to impeach the president.  Unlike Arti-
cle 152 of the 2014 Constitution, under which the president could be 
impeached only for committing high treason or felony, Article 159 of 
the 2014 Constitution added violation of the constitution as a possible 
impeachable offense. 
In fact, it seems that President Morsi’s misconduct (when in vio-
lation of the 2011 Constitutional Declaration he immunized his presi-
dential decrees as well as the work of the Constituent Assembly from 
judicial oversight) was the motive that urged the drafters to include 
“violation of the constitution” as an impeachable offense when com-
mitted by the president. Further, listing violation of the constitution 
as an impeachable offense enhances the political sense of the process 
of presidential impeachment, given that criminality overshadows of-
fenses like high treason and felony in the content of the Egyptian leg-
islation and jurisprudence. 
Second, unlike Article 152 of the 2012 Constitution, which re-
quired at least one-third of the members of the House of Representa-
tives to sign the impeachment resolution against the president, Article 
159 of the 2014 Constitution requires that such resolution be signed 
by a majority of the members of the House of Representatives.132  
Despite that difference, both Articles require a two-thirds majority of 
the House to impeach the president.133 As mentioned, requiring any 
kind of majority to submit an impeachment resolution seems unrea-
sonable since it acts as an undue. Further, a simple majority in the 
House seems sufficient to impeach the president simply because a 
decision to impeach represents the indictment against the president, 
not the conviction. 
In case an impeachment decision is reached, Article 159 requires 
“the President of the Republic to cease all work [in which] this is 
treated as a temporary impediment preventing the President from car-
 
 
132. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012, art. 152;  
 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 159. 
 133. Id. 
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rying out presidential duties until a verdict is reached in the case.”134 
According to Article 160, if the president encounters a temporary im-
pediment that renders him unable to exercise his official duties, the 
prime minister should take over the presidency.135 Consequently, if 
the president is impeached in the House, the prime minister should 
assume the office of presidency until a verdict is reached.136 
Interestingly, the Article states that the House can only be con-
vened to vote on impeaching the president after the Prosecutor Gen-
eral has investigated the case.  The Article is extremely vague regard-
ing whether the Prosecutor General should replace the committee of 
investigation found in Law No. 247/1956, responsible for investigat-
ing the impeachment resolution and for filtering any partisan interest 
or malicious motive.  Further, the 2014 Constitution followed the 
same course of the 2012 constitution regarding the appointment of 
the Prosecutor General, stating that the Prosecutor General is to be 
selected by the Supreme Judicial Council and appointed by a presi-
dential decree,137 which again guarantees the involvement of the pres-
ident in the process of the prosecutor’s appointment.138 Thus, desig-
nating the Prosecutor General to investigate the case against the 
president could hurt the impartiality of the impeachment process.139  
In designating the court of impeachment, the 2014 Constitution 
adopted the same formation introduced in the 2012 Constitution, in 
which Article 159 provided, 
 The President of the Republic is tried before a special 
court headed by the president of the Supreme Judicial 
Council, and with the membership of the most senior deputy 
of the president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, the 
 
 134. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 159.  
 135. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 160. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. “Public prosecution is carried out by a Prosecutor General who is selected by the 
Supreme Judicial Council from among the Deputies to the President of the Court of 
Cassation, the Presidents of the Court of Appeals or the Assistant Prosecutor Generals, 
by virtue of a presidential decree for a period of four years, or for the period remaining 
until retirement age, whichever comes first, and only once during a judge’s career.” Id. 
 138. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014. 
 139. Id.  
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most senior deputy of the president of the State Council, and 
the two most senior presidents of the Court of Appeals.140  
In fact, the approach of Article 159 in designating a special court to 
try the impeached president is justified by the fact that, unlike the 
2012 Constitution, the 2014 Constitution established a unicameral 
parliament with only one legislative chamber, the House of Repre-
sentatives.141  Consequently, the parliament lacks the upper house that 
could be vested with the power to try impeachments.  Notably, Arti-
cle 159 failed to avoid the criticism that it does not include any par-
liamentary representation, which was directed at the formation of the 
court of impeachment in the 2012 Constitution.  
In addition, Article 159 did not follow Article 3 of Law No. 
247/1956, stating that the House should elect managers to present the 
case; however, it designated the Prosecutor General to present the 
case of impeachment against the president before the court of im-
peachment, which is likely to harm the neutrality of the case.142  Fur-
ther, according to the Article, the Prosecutor General is to investigate 
the case before the House convenes to vote, and if there is an imped-
iment, one of his assistants should take over such investigation.143  
Moreover, the Article requires that if the Prosecutor General is im-
peded from presenting the case against the president, he should be re-
placed by order of seniority.144  Consequently, a situation could occur 
wherein the Prosecutor General would investigate the case, but 
somebody else would present it. 
The Article requires that the investigation and the trial proce-
dures are to be organized by Law No. 247/1956.145  Regarding pun-
ishment of impeachment, the Article requires the convicted president 
to be removed from office without prejudice to other penalties.146 Ac-
 
 140. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014; CONSTITUTION OF THE 
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 30 Nov. 2012 , art. 159. 
141. Records from the drafting process reveal that the drafters of the 2014 Constitution 
abolished the Shura Council found in the 2012 Constitution as the upper legislative 
chamber, arguing that it costs the state a financial burden without having a real legisla-
tive function. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014. 
 142. Id.; Law No. 247 of 1956, al-Jarida al-Rismiyyah, 14 June 1956. (Egypt). 
 143. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id.  
 146. Id.  
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cording to Article 6 of Law No. 247/1956 and Article 10 of the penal 
code, these penalties would be death, life imprisonment, aggravated 
imprisonment, or imprisonment for high treason and felonies.147  Fur-
ther, Article 25 of the Penal Code requires disqualification from as-
suming public office if one of the previous penalties is secured 
against the convict.148 
Interestingly, in the course of enhancing presidential accounta-
bility, the 2014 Constitution took an unprecedented step stating that 
the House of Representatives may vote no confidence against the 
president.149  Specifically, Article 161 stipulates that, 
 The House of Representatives may propose to withdraw 
confidence from the President of the Republic and hold ear-
ly presidential elections upon a causal motion signed by at 
least a majority of the members of the House of Representa-
tives and the approval of two-thirds of its members. . . Upon 
the approval of the proposal, the matter of withdrawing con-
fidence from the President of the Republic and holding early 
presidential elections is to be put to public referendum by 
the Prime Minister. If the majority approves the decision to 
withdraw confidence, the President of the Republic is to be 
relieved from his post. . . . 150 
In fact, Article 161 reveals the concerns of the constitutional 
drafters that after two uprisings, which toppled two regimes and se-
verely affected the country politically and economically, a constitu-
tional tool should be adopted to curb the presidential powers and re-
dress presidential misconducts.151  Though these concerns are 
legitimately justified, the constitutional drafters addressed them in the 
wrong way.  To be precise, subjecting the president to two different 
mechanisms to unseat him, impeachment and confidence withdrawal, 
reveals the great confusion the drafters had regarding systems of gov-
ernance.  On the first hand, a parliamentary vote of no-confidence is a 
 
 147. Law No. 58 of 1937, Al-Jarida al-Rismiyyah, 14 June 1956 (Egypt). 
 148. Law No. 58 of 1937 (The Penal Code), al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, Aug. 8, 1937, amended 
by Law No. 95 of 2003, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, June 19, 2003 (Egypt). 
 149. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 161. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
1 HOLDING THE EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/16  6:36 PM 
Holding the Executive Accountable  Vol. IV, No. I 
 33 
mechanism known in parliamentary systems to redress the executive 
where the president is a mere figurehead and the prime minister is the 
real executive. On the second hand, impeachment is the recognized 
tool in both presidential and semi-presidential systems to redress the 
executive’s misconduct where the president is a powerful figure who 
is highly involved in managing the state.  Provisions of the 2014 
Constitution reveal that Egypt is not by any means a parliamentary 
republic, such as would be appropriate to include an article that the 
president could be overthrown by a parliamentary no-confidence 
vote.  Further, despite the indispensability of having a constitutional 
tool that effectively holds the executive accountable for his official 
misconduct, the executive is likely to delegate most of his powers or 
to refrain from taking crucial decisions if he feels restricted by prose-
cution or removal. Accordingly, an attempt to trap the president be-
tween impeachment and the no-confidence vote would be of no use. 
Finally, the 2014 Constitution recognized ministerial impeach-
ment when Article 173 stated that, 
 [T]he Prime Minister and members of the government are 
subject to the general rules organizing investigation and trial 
procedures, if they commit crimes while exercising the 
functions of their posts or because of them. . . .In case of a 
charge of high treason against any members of the govern-
ment, the provisions stipulated in Article 159 of the Consti-
tution apply.152   
Indeed, a careful examination of the article reveals that it is untenably 
vague regarding the impeachable offenses against ministers.  Specifi-
cally, the beginning of the article subjects the prime minister and 
members of the government to the general rules of investigation and 
trial procedures if they commit crimes while exercising their official 
duties, without precisely naming any crime.153  Next, the end of the 
 
 152. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 173. In addition, 
Article 131 of the constitution granted the House of Representatives the right to with-
draw confidence from the prime minister, his deputies, ministers, or their deputies up-
on at least one-tenth of the members of the House, whereas a decision to withdraw 
confidence requires a majority of members. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF 
EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 131. 
 153. Id. 
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article subjects the prime minister and members of the government to 
provisions of Article 159, regarding impeaching the president, if they 
commit high treason.154  Consequently, the article considers high 
treason as the only offense that merits impeachment procedures 
against the prime minister and members of the government, whereas 
provisions of Law No. 79/1958 should govern the impeachment pro-
cedures and trial.155  However, if the prime minister and members of 
the government committed any crime other than high treason that is 
related to the performance of their official duties, they should be sub-
ject to general rules of investigation and trial procedures, which in 
this case would be provisions of the Civil and Commercial Proce-
dures Code, Criminal Procedures Code, and Penal Code.156 
In short, of fair assessment to the impeachment articles intro-
duced in the 2014 Constitution reveals another failure in liberating 
the impeachment process from the dominance of criminality. Despite 
the fact that the 2014 Constitution introduced “violation of the consti-
tution” as an offense meriting presidential impeachment, which 
helped to emphasize the political nature of the impeachable offense, 
it failed to define the crimes such as high treason and felony as im-
peachable offenses referring to Law No. 247/1956 and the Penal 
Code, which consider them criminal offenses.157  Likewise, as men-
tioned in the context of the 2012 Constitution, designating a special 
court with a dominant judicial formation without any parliamentary 
involvement to try the president raises considerable problems in that 
the impeachment trial excludes participation by the people’s repre-
sentatives.158 
 
 154. Law No. 79 of 1958, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 1958 (Egypt).  
 155. Id. 
 156. Law No. 13 of 1968, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 5 Sep. 1968 (Egypt). Law No. 150 of 
1950, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 15 Oct. 1951, amended by Law No. 95 of 2003, Al-
Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 19 June 2003 (Egypt). Law No. 58 of 1937, al-Jarida al-
Rismiyyah, 8 Aug. 1937, amended by Law No. 95 of 2003, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 19 
June 2003 (Egypt). 
 157. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 
1980, May 25, 2005, Mar.26, 2007, Jan. 18, 2014; Law No. 247 of 1956, al-Jarida al-
Rasmiyya, 1956 (Egypt).  
 158. Law No. 58 of 1937, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 8 Aug. 1937, amended by Law No. 95 of 
2003, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 19 June 2003 (Egypt). 
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Practicing Impeachment: The Case of President Morsi 
An impeachment mechanism cannot be fairly judged until it is 
tested. Specifically, carrying out an impeachment could reveal to 
what extent a rigid impeachment provision is likely to achieve its 
purpose regarding the clearness of impeachable offenses and the effi-
ciency of the legislative chamber in weighing the official misconduct 
and initiating the indictment procedures. Further, carrying out an im-
peachment tests the possibility of arguing and proving the official 
misconduct before the court of impeachment and the ease of access to 
governmental records. 
The absence of a precedent in which an Egyptian president has 
been impeached and removed renders the determination of the stand-
ards of impeachment a challenging process. However, this section 
will create a hypothetical case of impeachment by subjecting Presi-
dent Mohamed Morsi to impeachment procedures.  More precisely, it 
will address the question of what might have occurred if the Egyp-
tians had chosen a constitutional tool to overthrow President Morsi 
and whether it may have been possible to remove him through im-
peachment. 
Before proceeding to answer this question, it should be noted 
that the motive for examining President Morsi’s case rather than 
President Mubarak’s is that the ousting of the former is more recent 
and had serious repercussions.  Further, the fact that President Morsi 
was an elected president who had assumed power through a popular 
election urges consideration of his ousting as a paradigm for an im-
peachment case that might have happened. 
In the course of determining Morsi’s misconduct, we should ex-
clude crimes for which he is currently being prosecuted simply be-
cause most of them are criminal in nature, such as inciting the police 
to kill protesters.  Moreover, crimes that could be construed to mean 
high treason offenses–such as Morsi’s alleged collaboration with a 
foreign entity (the Palestinian militant group, Hamas) to escape from 
prison after the 2011 Revolution–were, if true, committed before he 
assumed power, though he was accused of them after his ouster.  
Likewise, we should also exclude misconduct that could be classified 
under the broad category of poor performance simply because im-
peachment is a very grave step that should not be triggered by a mere 
mistake in governance or bad political decision, as long as such mis-
take or decision does not entail a violation of the country’s laws, con-
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stitution, or national interest. Further, it is hard to find a definite 
measuring stick for poor performance, since what may be regarded 
by some as a poor performance deserving of impeachment may not 
be so in the eyes of others.159  Consequently, Morsi’s conduct in re-
fusing to dismiss an apparently inefficient cabinet and favoring his 
party’s members, as well as his economic and political acts, should 
be excluded. 
Having excluding Morsi’s non-impeachable misconduct, the 
question becomes what misconduct can appropriately be considered 
in building the impeachment case against him. One could argue that 
Morsi’s 2012 Constitutional Declaration, in which he immunized his 
presidential decrees and the work of the Constituent Assembly from 
judicial oversight in violation of the SCAF 2011 Constitutional Dec-
laration and dismissed the Prosecutor General in violation of the Ju-
dicial Authority Act, constituted an impeachable offense.160  Addi-
 
 159. The Iraqi constitution of 2005 is the only constitution of an Arabic country that allows 
the impeachment of the president for crimes, certain of which could be classified as 
poor performance. Article 138(2) (D) reads, “The House of Representatives can re-
move any member of the Presidency Council by a majority of three-fourths of its 
members because of inefficiency or lack of integrity.” Article 138, Section 2, Doustour 
Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.  Ali Youssef 
Al-shoukry defines lack of integrity to mean, “abusing using the office of the presi-
dency to achieve material or moral illegal gains.” Further, he defines presidential inef-
ficiency to mean “incapacity and inability of the president to perform the constitutional 
functions entrusted to him.” ALI YOUSSEF AL-SHOUKRY, AL-TANASOB BAIN SOLTET 
RA’YES EL-DAWLA W MAS’OLYATHO FI AL-DASATIR AL-ARABIA [PROPORTIONALITY 
BETWEEN THE POWER AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE ARAB 
CONSTITUTIONS] 170, 171 (2010). 
160. In fact, the 2012 Constitutional Declaration raises the dilemma of the constitutionality 
of constitutional acts, specifically, whether constitutional acts and amendments can be 
subjected to judicial review to determine their constitutionality. The constitutions of 
some countries grant the Supreme and Constitutional Courts such powers, such as 
Art.146(a) of the 1991 Romanian Constitution. ROMANIAN CONSTITUTION, 1991, art. 
146; Ion Deleanu & Emil Boc, The Control of the Constitutionality of Laws in Roma-
nia, 2(1) J. CONST. L. E. & C. EUROPE 119, 120, 124 (1995); Ioan Deleanu, Separation 
of Powers: Constitutional Regulation and Practice of the Constitutional Court, 3(1) J. 
CONST. L. E. & CENT. EUROPE 57, 63 (1996). See Yaniv Roznai, Legisprudence Limi-
tations on Constitutional Amendments? Reflections on the Czech Constitutional 
Court’s Declaration of Unconstitutional Constitutional Act, 8(1) VIENNA J ON INT’L 
CONST. L. 29 (2014) (showing how the Czech Constitutional Court extended the scope 
of its judicial review to include the constitutionality of constitutional acts and analyz-
ing the court’s decision regarding declaring the Constitutional Act no 195/2009 coll, 
on Shortening the Fifth Term of Office of the Chamber of Deputies to be unconstitu-
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tionally, his conduct in denigrating the judiciary in his public speech-
es, in which he blamed judges for acquitting Mubarak and his assis-
tants and rigging elections and referenda during Mubarak’s regimes, 
could be considered an impeachable offense.  Further, his conduct in 
issuing a presidential decree reinstating the 2012 Islamist-dominated 
People Assembly, after it had been dissolved by a decision of the Su-
preme Constitutional Court (SCC), was potentially impeachable.161 
Ultimately, one could see Morsi’s decision to pardon the Islamist ter-
rorist-convicts as an act that deserves impeachment, given that the 
decision likely contributed to the worsening of the already deteriorat-
ed security status in the country.162 
 
tional.) Despite the fact that the 2012 Constitutional Declaration was a constitutional 
act, its legitimacy is highly doubtful as compared to that of the 2011 Declaration. Spe-
cifically, the 2011 Declaration was approved by virtue of a popular referendum, and so 
gained its legitimacy from the approval of the public. In contrast, the 2012 Declaration 
was a unilateral act issued by a mere presidential decree, without subsequent approval 











161. On June 14, 2012, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the parliamentary elec-
tion that inaugurated the People’s Assembly was unconstitutional because one-third of 
the seats were illegitimately filled because political parties ran for independent seats, 
and ordered the dissolution of the entire legislative chamber. al- Mahkamah al-
Dusturiyah al- Ulya [Supreme Constitutional Court], case no. 20, 2012. In fact, the 
Court’s decision ignited the anger of Egypt’s Islamists and pro-Morsi who blockaded 
the Court’s building to overturn its ruling. As a result, on July 8, 2012, President Morsi 
issued a presidential decree ordering the re-institution of the dissolved legislative 
chamber ignoring the Court’s decision. See Mohamed Abdelaal, Egypt’s Public Pro-
test Law 2013: A Boost to Freedom or a Further Restriction?, 9 US-CHINA L. REV. n5 
(2014). Further, rumors started to leak that the SCC was considering dissolving the 
Constituent Assembly formed by the People Assembly to draft the 2012 Constitution, 
a matter which rushed the 2012 Constituent Assembly to vote on the constitutional 
draft in brief all-night sessions. NOAH FELDMAN, THE FALL OF THE ARAB SPRING 16, 17 
(Yale Law School Occasional Paper, 2013).  
 162. Some politicians and activists blamed Morsi’s decision to release the Islamist convicts 
for the turmoil and bombings that occurred after his ouster. 
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The question, then, is judging these offenses according to the 
impeachment clause found in the 2012 Constitution, could President 
Morsi have been impeached?  As mentioned before, Article 152 of 
the 2012 Constitution lists felonies and high treason as impeachable 
offenses if committed by the president.163  For the sake of discussion, 
we will assume that Morsi committed this misconduct after the ap-
proval of the 2012 Constitution.  The situation is that Morsi immun-
ized his presidential decrees, dismissed the Prosecutor General, deni-
grated the judiciary, and pardoned convicted Islamic extremists.  
Although this misconduct seems to have been a clear violation of the 
2012 Constitution, none of these acts are considered felonies or acts 
of high treason in the meaning of Article 152 of the 2012 Constitu-
tion.  As mentioned earlier, according to Article 10 of the Penal 
Code, felonies are those crimes punishable by death, life imprison-
ment, aggravated imprisonment, and imprisonment.164  Further, Arti-
cle 5 of Law No. 79 of 1958 considers “every crime that affects the 
safety or the external or the internal security of the state, or the repub-
lic regime” to be high treason.165  It is obvious that misconduct such 
as violating the law and the constitution, denigrating the judiciary, 
and pardoning radical convicts does not fall under the category of ei-
ther felonies or high treason.  Further, although the Egyptian Penal 
Code punishes public officials who refrain from executing a judicial 
ruling by imprisonment and removal from office, such offenses are 
considered misdemeanors that do not fall into the category of either 
impeachable felonies or treason.166  Consequently, it would not likely 
have been possible to impeach President Morsi under the 2012 Con-
stitution. 
 
 163. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22, 
1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007, Jan. 25, 2012, art. 152.  
 164. Law No. 58 of 1937, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 8 Aug. 1937, amended by Law No. 95 of 
2003, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 19 June 2003 (Egypt). 
 165. Law No. 79 of 1958, al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, art. 5, (Egypt).  
166. “Imprisonment and removal from office shall be the penalty inflicted on any public 
official or civil servant who uses the authority of his position in suspending the execu-
tion or orders issued from the government, or the provisions of laws and statutes, or in 
delaying the collection of funds and fees, or deliberately refrain from executing a rul-
ing or order issued by the court or by any competent authority.” Law No. 58 of 1937, 
al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, 8 Aug. 1937, amended by Law No. 95 of 2003, al-Jarida al-
Rasmiyya, 19 June 2003 (Egypt). 
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Regarding Morsi’s crisis with the SCC, as mentioned before, the 
conflict escalated when Morsi issued a presidential decree ordering 
the reinstitution of the People’s Assembly after it was dissolved by 
the SCC for its unconstitutional formation.167  In delivering its deci-
sion, the SCC firstly argued that Law No. 108 of 2011, which re-
placed certain articles of Law No. 38 of 1971 regarding the organiza-
tion of the People’s Assembly, allowed political parties to run for in-
independent seats as well as partisan seats in the People’s Assembly, 
and thus one-third of the Assembly’s seats had been illegitimately 
filled.168  In the second part of its decision, the court recommended 
the dissolution of the entire assembly, grounding its reasoning on the 
idea that since the 2012 parliamentary election was conducted pursu-
ant to an unconstitutional law, Law No.108 of 2011, the entire legis-
lative assembly must be declared null. 
A fair analysis of the Court’s decision reveals that the Court’s 
decision to nullify the Assembly’s partisan seats was valid because 
Law No. 108 of 2011 allowed political parties to run for independent 
seats, and thus there was direct infringement of the principle of equal-
ity. However, the Court’s decision to dissolve the entire legislative 
chamber was highly questionable. At first sight, the issue before the 
Court was only the constitutionality of Law No. 108 of 2011 in al-
lowing political parties’ candidates to run for independent parliamen-
tary seats and to the requirement that independent candidates include 
which political party they were affiliated with in the final electoral 
sheet.169  Accordingly, the Court’s approach in proceeding to dissolve 
the entire Assembly is likely to be interpreted as having exceeded its 
jurisdiction.  Moreover, not only did the Court go beyond its de-
signed jurisdiction by recommending the dissolution of the Assem-
bly, it did so above the will of the people who had elected the As-
 
 167. See Mohamed Abdelaal, Egypt’s Public Protest Law 2013: A Boost to Freedom or a 
Further Restriction?, 9 US-CHINA L. REV. n.5 (2014) [hereinafter Public Protest Law]. 
 168. Law No.108 of 2011, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 19 July 2011 (Egypt). “Candidates seek-
ing membership of the People’s Assembly should present their application in the con-
stituencies allocated to [independent candidates].  [This provision] should be applied 
on candidates running on the list of political parties.” Id. at art. 1. 
 169. “The Electoral Commission in each provision should prepare two final sheets; one in-
cludes names of independent candidates and the other includes names of partisan can-
didates. Each sheet must include the status of each candidate as well as the party to 
which he affiliates.” Id. at art. 2. 
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sembly’s members. Further, it should be borne in mind that Mubarak 
appointed the Court’s justices who issued this ruling and most of 
them opposed Morsi’s rule and policies.170  Thus, their desire to dis-
solve the Assembly just for being heavily dominated by the Islamists 
and the Muslim Brotherhood should be taken into account.171  Of 
course, one can sincerely argue that the law is the law and a judicial 
ruling must be honored regardless of the judge who issued it, espe-
cially if we know that Morsi’s intent towards the SCC was not inno-
cent, either.  Specifically, Morsi did not try to render the Court free 
from the executive’s influence. The 2012 Constituent Assembly, 
which was responsible for drafting the 2012 Constitution, deliberate-
ly “minimized the Court’s membership from 18 justices to 11” in an 
attempt to control the Court and exclude justices who opposed Mor-
si.172  Likewise, the Constitution of 2012 followed that of 1971, grant-
ing the president the sole power to appoint the president of the 
Court.173 
One can sincerely argue that the law is the law and a judicial rul-
ing must be honored regardless of the judge who issued it; however, 
when a ruling is highly questionable to the extent of challenging the 
will of the people, something should happen.  Consequently, I think 
Morsi would not have been impeached for reinstating the dissolved 
Assembly simply because his conduct seems to have been an attempt 
to correct the Court’s mistake given that the Court’s decisions are fi-
nal and cannot be judicially appealed. 
Second, given the tense relations between President Morsi and 
the judiciary, the former engaged in a series of misconduct regarding 
insulting the judiciary and degrading its legitimacy. For instance, in 
one of his public speeches, President Morsi accused an Egyptian 
 
 170. After the issuance of the 2012 Constitutional Declaration, some of the Court’s justices 
publicly criticized Morsi claiming that he has lost his legitimacy as a president for 
seizing powers and immunizing his decisions and decrees. Id.  
 171. Id. 
 172. Abdelaal, supra note 46, at 210. 
 
173. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 25 Jan. 2012, art. 176 (“Appoint-
ments take place by a decree from the President of the Republic.”)  Law No. 48 of 
1979, al-Jwida al-Rasmiyya, art. 5 (Egypt)(Further, the Court’s law provides that “The 
President of the state has the sole power to appoint the president of the Court, while 
members of the Court are to be appointed by the President with the approval of the 
Supreme Judicial Counsel.”) 
1 HOLDING THE EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABLE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/16  6:36 PM 
Holding the Executive Accountable  Vol. IV, No. I 
 41 
judge named ͑Ali El-Nimer of rigging elections and referendums con-
ducted in Mubarak’s era without providing any evidence.174  Further, 
Morsi argued that at least twenty-two judges were corrupt and had to 
be investigated and dismissed from the judiciary.175  According to Ar-
ticle 186 of the Egyptian penal code,  
 Whoever affronts by any of the foregoing methods, the 
standing, dignity, or authority of a judge in connection with 
a court action, shall be penalized with imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding six months and a fine of not less than 
five thousand pounds and not exceeding ten thousand 
pounds or either penalty.176   
Thus, in the meaning of the penal code, insulting or denigrating the 
judiciary is a misdemeanor that does not belong in the category of 
impeachable offenses under Article 152 of the 2012 Constitution, 
which allows impeachment of the president for felonies or treason. 
Third, Morsi’s conduct in pardoning convicts, while ignoring fi-
nal judgments secured against them as well as the country’s surge in 
insecurity, could be construed as an impeachable offense. Specifical-
ly, as mentioned earlier, Morsi pardoned many of the Islamic extrem-
ists who belong to Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Group), 
which has been responsible for many terrorist attacks in Egypt, and 
appointed one of its members as the governor of Luxor City despite 
being involved in the 1997 Luxor massacre of tourists.  Additionally, 
shortly after assuming power, Morsi issued a presidential decree par-
doning twenty-six convicts, some of whom had been sentenced to 
death for joining terrorist groups, inciting violence, and sabotaging 
police and military facilities.177  It should be noted that one of those 
pardoned convicts is Wagdy Ghoneim, who was convicted of inciting 
violence against non-Muslims and funding terrorist militias, and has 
 
 174. Mariam Rizk, Egypt: Islamist to be Tried for Insulting Judges, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Oct. 12, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/egypt-islamist-tried-insulting-judges-
155750489.html.   
 175. Id. 
 176. Law No. 58 of 1937 (Promulgating the Penal Code), al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya, art. 186 
(Egypt). 
 177. Law No. 75 of 2012 (Presidential Decree), al-Jarida al-Rasimyah, 26 July 2012 
(Egypt). 
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been banned from entry to the United States, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, and Bahrain for glorifying violence and 
committing hate speech.178  Further, in September 2012, Morsi issued 
two decrees whereby he pardoned 123 Sudanese convicted of mili-
tary felonies and misdemeanors for entering Egypt illegally and being 
present in prohibited military bases while carrying weapons.179 
Of course, one may argue that pardoning convicts lies within the 
limits of the constitutional presidential powers since Article 149 of 
the 2012 Constitution grants the president such power. However, in 
fact, given the chaos and surge of insecurity that Egypt witnessed af-
ter the ouster of Mubarak and during the regime of Morsi, pardoning 
these convicts was apparently an unwise decision.  By this decision, 
Morsi, who was an unpopular president, aimed to appease Egypt’s Is-
lamists and sought their support along with his group, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, in an attempt to form a coalition to stand against 
Egypt’s liberal bloc.  Despite the fact that pardoning convicts is a 
constitutional presidential power, Morsi’s conduct in pardoning Is-
lamic extremists would likely be construed as abusing his presidential 
powers.  Specifically, President Morsi abused his presidential power 
in pardoning convicts when he used that power to appease his allies 
and gain a political victory over his opponents while ignoring the 
country’s security interest; this was misconduct that deserved im-
peachment.180 
In fact, impeachment has been and will continue to be an ineffec-
tive tool to hold the executive accountable for his official miscon-
duct.  As mentioned, President Morsi was unlikely to be impeached 
because the impeachment clause in the 2012 Constitution failed to 
define the impeachable offenses and focused only on criminal ac-
 
 178. Law No. 75 of 2012 (Presidential Decree), al-Jarida al-Rasimyah, 26 July 2012 
(Egypt). 
 179. Law No. 155 of 2012 (Presidential Decree), al-Jarida al-Rasimyah, 3 Sept. 2012 
(Egypt); Law No. 157 of 2012 (Presidential Decree), al-Jarida al-Rasimyah, 3 Sept. 
2012 (Egypt). 
 180. See supra section II. The catchall phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors” found in the 
U.S. Federal Constitution accommodates non-criminal acts such as maladministration 
and betrayal of the public trust. In fact, Morsi’s misconduct in immunizing his presi-
dential decrees, undermining the judiciary, and abusing his presidential powers in par-
doning Islamic convicts could be construed to mean maladministration and betrayal of 
the public trust. 
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countability.  Given the fact that the impeachment clause introduced 
in the 2014 Constitution greatly resembles that of the 2012 Constitu-
tion, the next president is likely to escape the grip of impeachment.  
Accordingly, in Egypt, finding an alternative to impeachment in 
holding the executive accountable for official misconduct is a must. 
As mentioned in the introduction, we find the recall election to be the 
best alternative. 
The Recall Election as an Alternative 
Direct democracy, which means “delegation of political deci-
sions to the ordinary voter,” was the outcome of the doctrine of the 
consent of the governed, i.e. that an official derives his legitimacy 
from the consent of those who elect him.181  Consequently, direct de-
mocracy guarantees greater involvement by ordinary citizens in the 
process of decision-making, especially when the legislative bodies 
are mistrusted because of factional interests or malicious motives.182 
Direct democracy encompasses the notion of recall elections in 
addition to the initiative and referendum.183 On the first hand, the ini-
tiative enables ordinary voters to be directly involved in the process 
of legislation in that they can submit petitions proposing constitution-
al or legislative amendments.184  A referendum entails “the referring 
of a law or ordinance or any specific question to the people for deci-
sion at the polls.”185   
 
 181. Nathaniel Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, 
Referendum, and Recall Developed in the American War, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 
13 (1997); THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, 
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 12 (1999). (“Governments are instituted among men deriv-
ing their just powers from the consent of the governed.”) THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
 182. THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, 
AND RECALL 10 (1999). 
 183. Id. Proponents of direct democracy claim that, “Referendum, initiative, and recall are 
nonviolent means of political participation that fulfill a citizen’s right to petition the 
government for redress of grievances. Direct democracy increases voter interest and 
election-day turnout, giving the citizen more of a role in governmental processes might 
lessen alienation and apathy.” Id. at 11. 
 184. Id. at 2. 
 185. FRANK PARSON ET AL., A PRIMER OF DIRECT-LEGISLATION 3 (1906). Thomas Cronin 
defines the referendum to mean “[referring] a proposed or existing law or statute to 
voters for their approval or rejection.” CRONIN, supra note 182, at 12. 
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On the second hand, the recall is a mechanism whereby ordinary 
voters can remove an elected official before the end of their designat-
ed term.186  Nathaniel Persily argues that recall is “a method by which 
voters check their legislators at the polls.”187  Moreover, Timothy 
Power emphasizes the concept of direct democracy in a recall claim-
ing, “recall elections are based on the principle that a popular man-
date can be revoked by the people themselves, and thus constitute a 
powerful instrument of democratic accountability.”188  Likewise, De-
los Wilcox argues that recall elections “[guarantee the] right of the 
people to discharge their public servants when these public servants 
cease to be satisfactory to them.”189  Further, Thomas Cronin defines 
it as “the procedural democracy device that allows voters to discharge 
and replace a public official.”190 
Recall, an efficient tool of direct democracy to discharge elected 
officials, differs from impeachment.191  The common thread between 
the recall and impeachment is their constitutional function in unseat-
ing an incompetent elected official; however, unlike impeachment, 
which usually is initiated by legislators and requires a crime named in 
the constitution, ordinary voters (citizens) can initiate recall elections 
without requiring a specific crime to be committed by the recalled of-
ficial.192 
The recall device, which originated in the practice of Athenian 
democracy, allows citizens to vote to expel a politician from office.193  
Likewise, the Swiss customary law authorized citizens to vote to re-
move elected officials and councilmen before the expiration of their 
terms.194  In the United States, the recall tool can be dated back to the 
colonial era; it first appeared in the laws of the General Court of the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1631 as a device to remove elected of-
 
 186. Rachel Weinstein, You’re Fired!, The Voters’ Version of “The Apprentice”: An Analy-
sis of Local Recall Elections in California, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 131, 133 
(2005). 
 187. Persily, supra note 181, at 13. 
 188. TIMOTHY J. POWER, POLITICAL RIGHT IN POST AUTHORITARIAN BRAZIL: ELITES, 
INSTITUTIONS, AND DEMOCRATIZATION 123 (2000). 
 189. DELOS F. WILCOX, GOVERNMENT BY ALL THE PEOPLE 169 (1912). 
 190. CRONIN, supra note 182, at 125. 
 191. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 133. 
 192. Id.; Persily, supra note 181, at 13. 
 193. CRONIN, supra note 182, at 128. 
 194. Id. at 129. 
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ficials.195  Moreover, during the American Revolution, the Articles of 
Confederation authorized state legislatures to recall delegates of the 
Continental Congress appointed by them.196  The recall was also de-
bated at the ratifying conventions; the New York convention pro-
posed a constitutional amendment whereby state legislatures could 
recall their senators.197  Further, the Virginia Plan proposed a bicam-
eral legislature in which recall was to be applied in the national legis-
lature.198  However, the recall provision failed to survive and was not 
adopted in the federal constitution.199 
The Progressive Movement in the west witnessed the rise of di-
rect democracy provisions in the U.S. western states.200  However, 
such states limited direct democracy to the initiative and referendum 
without including the recall device.  For instance, in 1898, South Da-
kota amended its constitution to allow its citizens to propose laws 
through initiatives and to approve laws through the referendum de-
vice.201  In 1902, the state legislature of California amended the state 
constitution so that citizens of certain cities could amend their char-
 
 195. Joshua Spivak, California’s Recall: Adoption of the “Grand Bounce” for Elected Offi-
cials, 81 CAL. HIST. 20, 22 (2004). 
 196. “A power reserved to each state, to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time 
within the year, and to send others in their stead, for the remainder of the Year.” THE 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. V; see CRONIN, supra note 182, at 129. 
 197. CRONIN, supra note 182, at 129. 
 198. “…members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the 
people of the several States .  and to be subject to recall.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 21 (Max Farrand, ed., 1911).  Patrick Henry of Virginia 
argued that the constitution lacks “a mechanism to ensure that senators would follow 
the instructions of their states.” Weinstein, supra note 186, at 134. 
 
199. Those who opposed a federal recall provision argued that it would cause the national 
senators to serve at the “emotionalism of the people.” Alexander Hamilton argued that 
the proposed national senate should be in some measure a check upon the state gov-
ernments.” CRONIN, supra note 182, at 129. 
 200. Persily, supra note 181, at 15.  Populists and progressives argued that impeachment 
provisions in the federal constitution were insufficient to redress elected officials 
claiming that “impeachment punishes only malfeasance in office, not misfeasance or 
nonfeasance,” and that impeachment is hard to reach beyond the boundaries of graft. 
CRONIN, supra note 182, at 130. 
 201. Steven L. Plot, The Origins of the Initiative and Referendum in South Dakota: The Po-
litical Context, 12 GREAT PLAINS Q. 181 (1992). 
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ters by initiative.202   From 1898 to 1959, as direct democracy provi-
sions continued to rise, many states and cities adopted the initiative 
and referendum in their charters and constitutions as a means of di-
rect democracy.203 
In 1903, the idea of a recall was first adopted in the United States 
on the municipal level when Los Angeles approved a new charter that 
included the recall device.204  In 1908, Michigan and Oregon became 
the first two states to adopt the recall device on the state level.205  To-
day, Nineteen states allow the recall of state officials;206 Thirty-six 
states and the District of Colombia allow recalling local officials207 
and Twenty-nine states include recall provisions in their statutes, al-
low the use of such provision at the local level throughout the state.208  
Since the adoption of the recall device in the constitutions and stat-
utes if these states, many state legislators and local officials have 
been recalled. However, only two governors—Lynn Frazier of North 
Dakota in 1921 and Gray Davis of California in 2003—have been 
successfully recalled.209 
 
 202. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 135 (citing V.O. Key & Winston W. Crouch, THE 
INITIATIVE AND THE REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA 428 (G.M. McBride et al. eds., 
1939)). 
203. For instance, in 1910, California cities of Alameda, Berkeley, Eureka, Long Beach, 
Los Angeles, Modesto, Monterey, Palo Alto, Petaluma, Richmond, Riverside, Sacra-
mento, Salinas, San Bernardino, San Diego, San Francisco, San Louis Obispo, Santa 
Barbara, Santa Cruz, and Santa Monica adopted the initiative and referendum. After 
being admitted into the United States, in 1956, Alaska adopted the initiative and refer-
endum in its constitution. Further, states including Illinois, Florida, and Mississippi 
passed constitutional amendments allowing the initiative and referendum. Id, at 134-
35. 
 204. Id. at 136. Dr. John Randolph Haynes, founder of the Direct Legislation League of Los 
Angeles and a member of the committee to revise the Los Angeles charter, played a 
great role in adopting the recall provision after he observed the role of the recall device 
in Switzerland, arguing that it is an effective mechanism for overthrowing incompetent 
or corrupt officials. Cronin, supra note 182, at 131. 
 205. Spivak, supra note 195, at 23; See also Recall of State Officials, NAT’L. CONF. OF ST. 
LEGIS. (Sept. 11 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/recall-
of-state-officials.aspx#History. 
 206. Id. These states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, 
Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
 207. Weinstein, supra note 186, at 138. 
 208. NAT’L. CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. , supra note 205. 
 209. Id. 
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Despite the fact that state statutes vary widely regarding the re-
quired number of signatures to initiate a recall, and the grounds for 
recall,210 states are likely to follow the same procedures to initiate the 
recall device. Specifically, registered voters should initiate a petition 
campaign;211 once the petition meets the required number of signa-
tures, it should be circulated to an election committee for review.212  
Once the committee declares the petition and its signatures valid, a 
recall election must be held.213 
Internationally, Venezuela seems to be the only country that lists 
the recall as a constitutional tool for removing a president.214  Specifi-
cally, Article 233 of the 1991 constitution provides that “[T]he Presi-
dent of the Republic shall become permanently unavailable to serve 
by reason of any of the following events: death, resignation, or recall 
by popular vote.”215  Further, a detailed constitutional mechanism re-
garding the number of signatures required to initiate a recall petition 
and the percentage of the vote required to render the recall referen-
dum valid can be found in Article 72 of the 1991 Constitution, which 
reads, 
 
 210. Id. Only eight states require specific grounds for recall. These states are Alaska, Geor-
gia, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington. Most of 
these grounds are limited to some forms of malfeasance, incompetence, misconduct or 
misuse in office, violation of oath, conviction of certain felonies and misdemeanor, or 
negligence of duty.  
 211. Elizabeth Mack, Comment, The Use and Abuse of Recall: A Proposal for Legislative 
Recall Reform, 67 NEB. L. REV. 617, 625 (1988), 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1818&context=nlr.   
 212. Id. 
 213. Id 
 
 
214. POWER, supra note 188.  In Philippines, according to the 1987 Constitution and the 
Local Government Code of 1991, elected local government officials are subject to re-
moval by recall. A recall election may be called if either at least 25% of the registered 
voters in a Local Government Unit or a majority of all elected official in this Local 
Government Unit endorse it. In Brazil, Domingos Leonelli, a member of the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) submitted a proposal to adopt the recall device 
to the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) arguing that “the notorious lack of ac-
countability of elected officials is perhaps the leading popular complaint against the 
political system.” However, the Assembly overwhelmingly rejected the proposal.  
 215. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA , Dec. 15, 1999, art. 
233.  
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 [A]ll offices filled by popular vote are subject to revoca-
tion. Once one-half of the term of office to which an official 
has been elected has elapsed, a number of voters represent-
ing at least 20% of the registered voters in the affected con-
stituency may petition for the calling of a referendum to re-
voke that official’s mandate. When a number of voters equal 
to or greater than the number of those who elected the offi-
cial vote in favour of the recall, provided that a number of 
voters equal to or greater than 25% of the total number of 
registered voters vote in the recall referendum, the official’s 
mandate shall be deemed revoked and immediate action 
shall be taken to fill the permanent vacancy as provided for 
by this constitution and by law.216 
The recall device has only been used against the Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chávez.217 The February 2003, the first attempt to re-
call President Chávez occurred when opposition figures campaigned 
for collecting signatures against Chávez after a nationwide strike.218  
In August 2003, Súmate, a Venezuelan volunteer civic society organ-
ization, succeeded in gathering and submitting approximately 3.2 
million signatures to the National Electoral Council (CNE).219 How-
ever, the CNE invalidated the signatures, arguing that they had been 
collected prematurely before the elapse of the midpoint of the presi-
dential term as provided by Article 72 of the constitution.220 
In November 2003, the second attempt to recall President Chá-
vez commenced when the opposition began to collect a new set of 
signatures in support of recalling him.  According to the 20% of vot-
ers required by Article 72, only 2.4 million signatures are needed;221 
however, the opposition claimed to have submitted more than 3.4 
 
 216. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA , Dec. 15, 1999, art. 72. 
 217. See generally OBSERVING THE VENEZUELA PRESIDENTIAL RECALL REFERENDUM: 
COMPREHENSIVE REPORT  (The Carter Center, 2005), 
https://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2020.pdf [hereinafter VENEZUELA 
PRESIDENTIAL RECALL REFERENDUM]. 
 218. Id. at 26.  
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. In fact, the CNE was formed by the Venezuelan Supreme Court (TSJ) after the Na-
tional Assembly failed “to reach a consensus and choose unbiased, nonpartisan repre-
sentatives.” 
 221. Id. at 28. 
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million to the CNE for verification in December of the same year.222  
In April 2004, the CNE declared 1,910,965 signatures valid;223 
375,241 completely invalid;224 and 1.192.914 signatures dubious with 
the possibility of being reaffirmed.225  Accordingly, in May, the CNE 
held a reparo process allowing owners of dubious signatures to reaf-
firm them.226  The outcome of this reparo was that 754,397 signatures 
were accepted, bringing the total number of signatures collected to 
2.5 million.227  As a result, in June, the CNE announced that a recall 
referendum would be held on August 15, 2004.228  The referendum 
was defeated when 59% of the electorate (5.8 million) voted in favor 
of President Chávez to stay in office,229 while 41% (3.9 million) vot-
ed in favor of recalling him.230 
The Case of Egypt 
The overthrow of Mubarak and Morsi through popular uprisings, 
notwithstanding the presence of impeachment clauses in the 1971 and 
2012 Constitutions, reveals the extent to which the impeachment de-
vice is ineffective and very difficult to be triggered in Egypt for many 
reasons.  For example, as previously mentioned, due to the vagueness 
of the impeachment clause means it is very hard to stand on the actu-
al grounds of impeachment and that it only raises the criminal ac-
countability of the executive, while ignoring political accountabil-
ity.231 
The weakness of Egypt’s successive parliaments significantly 
contributed to rendering the impeachment device ineffective because 
they were subordinate to the chief executive.  Specifically, Mubarak 
ruled the country for almost thirty years, during which the National 
Democratic Party (“NDP”), Mubarak’s political party, was the ruling 
 
 222. Id. 
 223. VENEZUELA PRESIDENTIAL RECALL REFERENDUM, supra note 217. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. VENEZUELA PRESIDENTIAL RECALL REFERENDUM, supra note 217. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Sahar Aziz, Egypt’s Impeachment Alternative, SADA (Oct. 31, 2013), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=53475 [hereinafter Impeachment Alternative].  
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party.  Consequently, during Mubarak’s era, the parliamentary major-
ity was always reserved to the NDP, which rendered the country 
without an effectively represented opposition.  Similarly, during 
Morsi’s era, the parliament was heavily dominated by Egypt’s Islam-
ists, particularly the Freedom and Justice Party (“FJP”), the political 
party of the Muslim Brotherhood, under the flag of which President 
Morsi ran for the presidency.232  Thus, parliament, who initiates the 
impeachment procedures, was always controlled by the president, 
which rendered the whole process unlikely to occur.233 
As previously mentioned, listing withdrawal of confidence as a 
constitutional way to discharge the president aside from the im-
peachment device is likely to be interpreted as an attempt by the 
drafters to curb the president by a parliamentary vote of no confi-
dence rather than the ineffective impeachment device. 
Therefore, the recall election could be the optimal alternative to 
impeachment in Egypt. Egypt had a remarkable incident where cer-
tain elements of the recall device were prematurely tested.  After pub-
lic outrage escalated against President Morsi, the opposition urged 
him to call for a recall election so that he could run again for the pres-
idency; however, Morsi remained adamant and refused.  A move-
ment, named Tamarod (Rebel), formed with the intention of gather-
ing signatures from citizens to call for President Morsi to step down 
and allow an early presidential election. 
Both the positions of the opposition, in gathering signatures call-
ing for an early election, and of President Morsi, refusing to step 
down, were justified.  At first, it seems that the opposition sought to 
avoid chaos that accompanied Mubarak’s removal by deferring to a 
civilized, constitutional means of direct democracy in which ordinary 
voters would be involved through signing petitions calling for an ear-
ly presidential election.  On the other hand, President Morsi’s con-
duct in refusing to call for an early election can be criticized for ex-
posing the country to chaos and the climate of polarization between 
his allies and opponents.  He cannot be blamed constitutionally be-
cause, according to the 2012 Constitution, the only way to discharge 
the president is either through his resignation or impeachment.  Con-
 
 232. Aziz, supra note 49.  
 233. Impeachment Alternative, supra note 231.  
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sequently, since the constitution does not stipulate so, it would have 
been just a presidential grant if Morsi had agreed to step down and 
allow an early presidential election.234 
Indeed, the process of initiating a petition and gathering signa-
tures against President Morsi reveals the extent to which the Egyp-
tians were near the recall device and how they sought the involve-
ment of ordinary voters to overthrow Morsi when it was clear that the 
parliament was too weak to initiate impeachment procedures against 
the President.  However, the only obstacle that the opposition met 
was that the recall device was not recognized in the 2012 Constitu-
tion. It seems that the drafters of the 2014 Constitution did not realize 
the importance of the recall in the Egyptian political system, since it 
was excluded from the country’s current constitution. 
Since the impeachment provision is unlikely to redress presiden-
tial misconduct for the reasons stated above, the recall device seems 
to be the adequate alternative.  In fact, an amendment is indispensa-
ble to adopt the recall device as a constitutional way to discharge the 
president with Egypt’s current constitution.  However, the question 
is, how can the recall provision to be drafted? 
First, the proposed provision should provide that the president 
could be recalled after the expiration of half of the presidential term, 
“two years.”235  In fact, two years will be sufficient to evaluate the 
work of the president and his competency, as any judgment before 
this period is likely to be hasty and premature.  Second, the recall 
provision should require that at least 40% of the registered voters (20 
million)236 petition by gathering signatures, calling for a popular ref-
erendum to recall the president.  Third, the president should be 
deemed recalled if at least 45% of the total number of the registered 
voters (22.5 million) vote in the referendum, provided that at least a 
number of voters who elected the president vote “yes” to recall the 
president. 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 140 (“The Presi-
dent of the Republic is elected for a period of four calendar years, commencing on the 
day the term of his predecessor ends. The President may only be reelected once”). 
 236. The total number of the eligible registered voters in Egypt is estimated to be 50 mil-
lion. Egyptian elections preliminary results, JADALIYYA (Jan. 9, 2012), 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3192/the-concise-idiots-guide-to-the-egyptian-
elections. 
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Finally, the recall provision should also assign the task of receiv-
ing and checking the validity of the signatures and calling for the ref-
erendum to the National Elections Commission established by the 
2014 Constitution,237 and specify that the Supreme Constitutional 
Court (SCC) should oversee any dispute regarding the number and 
validity of the gathered signatures.  Further, the provision should 
specify whether only ordinary voters have the right to participate in 
the petition campaign or whether civil society organizations could be 
involved as well. 
However, the main drawback of the recall device is the lack of 
definition of the misconduct required by the law to recall the official.  
More specifically, the proposed recall provision should make clear 
that the president must display certain misconduct such as malfea-
sance, misfeasance, or apparent incompetency to be recalled.  Such a 
requirement is very important in a country like Egypt where the op-
position is far from being organized, and people are likely to be led 
by the media to avoid removing a president for being unpopular and 
to avoid harassing or threatening him.  Further, if the impeachment 
provision is to be revoked, defining what counts as presidential mis-
conduct in the recall provision will be inevitable. 
However, the recall mechanism could be challenging and risky 
in that it could produce a polarized political atmosphere in which a 
petition campaign could be initiated to remove the executive just for 
his policy’s views,238 which might lead to political turmoil.239  More-
over, the process of gathering the required number of signatures 
might be costly and require a dedicated number of individuals to 
place the initiative on the ballot.240  Further, the fact that ordinary 
voters who initiate the petition campaign bear the burden of proving 
the official misconduct makes the process of holding the president 
 
 237. “The National Elections Commission is exclusively responsible for managing referen-
da and presidential, parliamentary and local elections, which includes the preparation 
and update of a database of voters, proposal and division of constituencies, setting 
regulations for and overseeing electoral campaigns, funding, electoral expenditure dec-
laration thereof, and managing the procedures for out-of-country voting by expatriate 
Egyptians, and other procedures, up to the announcements of results.” CONSTITUTION 
OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 18 Jan. 2014, art. 208. 
 238. CRONIN, supra note 182, at 146. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 62. 
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accountable through the recall more challenging due to their inexpe-
rience and the difficulty of gaining access to official records and doc-
uments.241 
Thus, criticism of the recall petition campaign for being lengthy 
and costly could be contained by allowing volunteers from each prov-
ince and registered civic organizations to participate under the super-
vision of the National Electoral Commission.  Further, one could rely 
on the role of political parties, impartial media, and civic community 
awareness campaigns to train ordinary voters to initiate a petition and 
to educate them that removing the president is a grave step, which 
should be taken only with high caution when determined by a simple 
yes or no vote. 
Conclusion 
In sum, given that Egypt’s impeachment clause is weak and 
vague to effectively hold the president accountable, as well as the dif-
ficulty of proving official corruption in a court of law and the fact 
that the recall device provides a reasonable and effective check on the 
executive when the legislature is inefficient or corrupt; guarantees the 
involvement of the people in the process of removing the elected of-
ficial; increases trust in the elected official who survives a referen-
dum; and limits undesirable factional interests that might steer the 
impeachment vote in the legislature,242 the recall device seems to be a 
good embodiment of accountability as well as an excellent alternative 










 241. Id. at 135. 
 242. Id. at 134–35. Indeed, ordinary voters might be directed by their factional interests in 
initiating the petition campaign; however, such factional interests are likely not to be 
as influential as law-makers during impeachment. Further, any factional interest or 
malicious motive is likely to be defeated in the recall referendum. Id.  
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